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The Law Academy and the Public
Intellectual
Arthur Austin*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Posner in Decline?
The Wolfes I of the Received Wisdom got the opportunity for a
good old payback time when Judge Richard Posner stumbled with
the publication of Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline.2 Per-
haps expectations were too high for someone esteemed as the na-
tion's preeminent intellectual - the "object of scholarly envy and
awe."3 Certainly he could not expect favors after "an omni direc-
tional Gatling gun" spree in which he hurls bombs at every other
pretender 4 and, relying on "his own hunches and grudges,"5 deter-
mines the boundaries of who is a Public Intellectual. 6 Alan Wolfe,
who made the cut, complains that Posner's decisions "are not
merely arbitrary; they are nonsensical."7 But it was not the crite-
* Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Jurisprudence, Case Western Reserve Univer-
sity School of Law.
1. See Alan Wolfe, The Fame Game, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 2001, at 34.
2. RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE (2001)
[hereinafter PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS].
3. James Ryerson, The Outrageous Pragmatism of Judge Richard Posner,
LINGUA FRANCA, May/June 2000, at 27.
4. David Brooks, Notes from a Hanging Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002,
(Book Review), at 9.
5. Caleb Crain, License to Ink, THE NATION, Feb. 22, 2001, at 25 (reviewing
RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE (2001)).
6. See Jay Tolson, All Thought Out?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 11,
2002, at 54.
7. Wolfe, supra note 1, at 35.
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ria; it was the list of top Public Intellectuals determined solely by
media hits that rankled the "group."8 "If the word intellectual can
be applied to both William Butler Yeats and former Clinton ad-
viser Sidney Blumenthal, its definition has become promiscuous
beyond all hope of sense or meaning,"9 a "preposterous roster."10
Nevertheless, Posner's thesis that public discourse is domi-
nated by Public Intellectuals "affiliated" with the Law Academy
survives the snide putdowns by mean-spirited elitist egalitarians.
The college subsidies of income and free time invite professors to
communicate with a receptive and pliable second non-peer audi-
ence: "the educated general public, itself expanding with the ex-
pansion of university education."" Working the public market
involves less nuanced preparation and delivery and, in Posner's
judgment, produces unsatisfactory results. Much of the book - the
skewing part - is consumed by Posner's "instinctive hostility"12 to
the arrogance, bias, and outright stupidity of academic Public
Intellectuals. 13
In their zeal to pounce on Posner's apparent lapses his critics
ignore the obvious flaw: despite an impressive legal pedigree the
Judge does not examine the law professor as a discrete genre of
Public Intellectual. In an afterthought chapter, he spends twenty-
8. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 209-11. A list that "blithely ar-
rays the likes of Sidney Blumenthal, Bill Moyers and Ann Coulter on a continuum
with Henry Kissinger, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Gerry Wills and, of course, himself."
Gary Rosen, He Has a Little List - and a Long Indictment, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15,
2002, at A14; Eric Alterman, Judging the Wise Guys, THE NATION, Jan. 28, 2002,
at 10 ("[Plure nonsense"); Christopher Caldwell, Mind Games, NAT'L REV., Feb. 11,
2002, at 45 ("Much of Posner's analysis of intellectual life rests on this exercise in
garbage-in, garbage-out.") (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS:
A STUDY OF DECLINE (2001)); Crain, supra note 5, at 26 ("It is disconcerting to see
Camille Paglia and Oliver Wendell Holmes nearly tied in a ranking by media
mentions.").
9. Tolson, supra note 6.
10. Jamie Malanowski, Infinite Jest, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 2002, at 57 (re-
viewing RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE (2001)).
11. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 27.
12. David J. Garrow, A Tale of Two Posners, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 341, 343 (2002)
("Posner's instinctive hostility is focused upon what he views quite correctly as the
utter unresponsiveness of the 'market' for public intellectuals to inept or indeed
consistently erroneous job performance by widely-celebrated purveyors. Ergo
Judge Posner has a defensibly clear idea of what it is he doesn't like, but even his
most broad-stroke presumptions about why this state of affairs has come to exist
suffer from misconceptions that greatly blinder his otherwise quite inclusive
explorations.").
13. Id. at 343-49.
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seven pages describing law as a source of dialogue of general "dubi-
ous interventions" by Public Intellectuals on behalf of notorious
criminals, for example, Sacco-Vanzetti and Drayfus 14 or of the
"trash"15 of expert witnesses who, as Postmodernists, disdain truth
and view testifying under oath a form of politics. 16 His conclusion:
"how unfitted therefore most lawyers, even brilliant academic law-
yers, are to play well the public-intellectual role."17
Admitting that his is not "the correct" definition, 18 Posner pro-
ceeds to eliminate the unfit (his competition), by narrowly defining
the relevant product market. The audience is the general public,
thus excluding various categories of specialization.' 9 Translating
the application of technology is not included, while explaining its
ethical implication is. The relevant topics are of interest to a gen-
eral educated public, ideally conveyed with authority, composed
with precision, and spiked with an ideological or political edge.
"The intellectual is more 'applied,' contemporary, and 'result-ori-
ented' than the scholar, but broader than the technician." 20 Pos-
ner's litmus test is communication with the public - not
intramural exchange. 2'
B. Posner "Disses" Microeconomics
Posner's Public Intellectual profile is an open invitation to the
"affiliated" law academic. Legal education is, for faculty success, a
"soft" field; student-edited journals assure publication and tenure,
teaching loads are light, leaving time for media-sensitive moon-
lighting in high recognition "public" service enterprises. The inter-
14. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 359.
15. Id. at 365-66 ("The critic who testifies in a courtroom knows that his testi-
mony will never be submitted to a jury of his academic peers - that if they get wind
of it all they will commend him for doing the Lord's work in trying to hamstring
the prosecution.").
16. Id. at 366.
17. Id. at 386.
18. Id. at 25.
19. Thus violating the "sub-market" category. "The outer boundaries of a
product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the
cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it. How-
ever, within this broad market, well-defined sub-markets may exist which, in
themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes." Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
20. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 24.
21. Thereby excluding John Rawls, who "received some play in the popular
media." Id. at 25.
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disciplinary law school curriculum provides training in topical
topics of interest to the educated public, which can be conveyed by
scholars trained in rhetoric. Moreover, the law academic's status
as a cross between scholar and pragmatist/activist inspires an ap-
peal and sometimes celebrity status to, in Posner's market terms,
"enhance the credibility of the output with that audience."22
Despite the suggestive transferability of expertise, lawyers are
poorly represented on Posner's Top 100 List. Of a total of thirteen,
only five are active academicians: Alan Dershowitz, Jonathan
Turley, Susan Estrich, Laurence Tribe, and Lani Guinier. Posner
ignores discussion of Estrich and Turley, briefly mentions that
President Clinton's withdrawal of Guinier's nomination for head of
the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice gave her
martyr status enabling her to launch a Public Intellectual career
on issues of race,23 accuses Tribe of disingenuousness on abor-
tion,24 and condemns Dershowitz for resorting to "Chomsky-
speak"25 in making misleading distinctions in his defense of Presi-
dent Clinton.26
The mainstream work of the Law Academy Public Intellectual
as defined by Posner does not square with his interest in a broad
based macro-economic analysis of multiple intellectual genres
(literature, political satire, the Jeremiah School, 27 public philoso-
phy, law). Disentanglement from a law pedigree enables him to
indulge a fascination with an undergraduate literature major, 28 to
apply economics to Aldous Huxley's Brave New World and George
Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four,29 to skewer Robert Bork as an ex-
emplar of the "casualness with which declinists handle evi-
dence,"30 and to show that Martha Nussbaum's dependence on
22. Id. at 49.
23. Id. at 57.
24. Id. at 91.
25. Id. at 126. "Chomsky is an irresistible example of the quality problem that
besets the market for academic public intellectuals." Id. at 89.
26. For a Posner critic who agrees with Posner on Dershowitz's behavior, see
Garrow, supra note 12, at 344 n.14.
27. Posner calls this "[d]eclinist works," a genre of "cultural pessimism or na-
tional decline." PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 282.
28. Id. at 239 ("[TIhe literary critic as public intellectual not only devalues
literature but may actually endanger it.").
29. Id. at 271 (The contrast between the two novels' view on sex "suggests that
there may not be a unique totalitarian position on sexual freedom.").
30. Id. at 285.
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Aristotle is as "opportunistic as Catharine MacKinnon's alliance
with Edwin Meese in the war against pornography." 31
Under Posner's explication the macro-analysis produces an ec-
lectic portmanteau book of gangsta rap put-downs and idiosyn-
cratic flights of irrelevancies. 32 The market, he says, is in default -
primarily the result of the work of the academic Public Intellectual
who "is on holiday from the academic grind and all too often dis-
plays the irresponsibility of the holiday goer."3 3 Yet inexplicably -
especially for an economist - Posner ignores the micro side of the
market - he fails to engage in a discussion of the dynamics of the
fields or disciplines from whence the Public Intellectuals derive
their vision.34 The result is an anomaly - an economic analysis
without an analysis of what determines the demand curve for
scholarship resources in the Law Academy Public Intellectual mar-
ket. On the significance of a balanced macro-micro evaluation, the
late Paul Samuelson said: "You are less than half-educated if you
understand one while being ignorant of the other."35
C. A Prdcis
In this essay I use Richard Posner's macro-protocol of the Pub-
lic Intellectual phenomenon as reference for a discussion of its im-
plication for legal scholarship. My thesis is that legal scholarship
has developed a symbiotic connection with Public Intellectualism
and in its contemporary manifestation legal scholarship often
blurs with, or is virtually interchangeable with, Posnerian Public
31. Id. at 333. Nussbaum has the last word: to her Posner views life as all
"struggle and suffering." See Ryerson, supra note 3, at 34 (quoting Martha
Nussbaum).
32. Prompting one critic to conclude: "Posner has the attention span of a car-
toon character." Caldwell, supra note 8, at 46.
33. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 389.
34. In the final chapter Posner continues his frustration at "the modern uni-
versity" which subsidizes the soft life to monopolize the public intellectual, es-
teemed for contrariness - a "niche... likely to go unfilled as more and more public
intellectuals opt for the safe and secure life of a university professor." Id. at 388.
To correct this market imperfection, Posner offers several "constructive sugges-
tions" that border on the irrational: "one solution might be for universities to re-
quire their faculty members to post annually, on the university's Web page, all the
non academic writing... that they have done during the preceding year. . . '" Id.
at 390. Next he proposes disclosure of "income from all their public intellectual
work...." Id. at 393.
35. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 362 (7th ed.
1967).
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Intellectualism. The law faculty market is a diverse portfolio of
intellectual commentary circulated to an inclusive community of
communication mediums - from elite law journals to bare-knuckle
talk shows. My discussion of the evaluation of scholarship cross-
elasticity of demand is prefaced by a short profile of Fred Rodell
whose career at Yale Law School illustrates the long-standing fric-
tion between the Law Academy and Public Intellectualism. I next
chart the post-Rodell erosion of the traditional doctrinal scholar-
ship paradigm, with emphasis on Postmodern influences on the
Law Academy. The resulting changes have created a revised legal
scholarship market, congenial to Public Intellectualism, while
sponsoring a new context for writing, promotion, tenure, and ca-
reer options. After identifying those factors that transformed
traditional scholarship conventions, I return to Professor Rodell to
confront the ultimate issue: How would he, and his new colleagues,
fare under present conditions?
II. FRED RODELL: FROM LAw PROFESSOR TO PUBLIC
POSTMODERN INTELLECTUAL
At the micro level, the initial point of inquiry is the scholar-
ship conventions of the affiliated academic's discipline. The doctri-
nal method of problem solving and analysis, reviewed by critical
evaluation, has defined legal scholarship since the inception of the
casebook method.36 Up to the 1930s, scholars achieved success
with doctrinal articles on basic areas like torts, contracts, criminal
law, or property law, received tenure and then relaxed by writing a
treatise.37 Then came the ideological rush and excitement of the
36. See Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90
YALE L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1981) ("[Doctrinal scholarship] involves the careful read-
ing and comparison of appellate opinions with a view to identifying ambiguities,
exposing inconsistencies among cases and lines of cases, developing distinctions,
reconciling holdings, and otherwise exercising the characteristic skills of legal
analysis.").
37. The classical tradition of law scholarship is epitomized in the treatises of
Samuel Williston (Contracts), John Henry Wigmore (Evidence), and Arthur Corbin
(Contracts). They were the masters of vocational-doctrinal writing; large numbers
of cases were compared, analyzed, and criticized. In a succinct and elegant style,
the grand treatise writers succeeded in identifying rules and defining their opera-
tional effects. To the vocationalist, the treatise is the highest form of scholarship.
A legal treatise (which must be a multi-volume set, not a single book) was written
to be read and used by the profession. If Dean Wigmore supported your position,
you won. If Professor Corbin stood against your argument, you talked settlement.
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New Deal, an event assumed too important to practice balanced
restraint, compelling professors to adopt a strident, subjective ad-
vocacy style.38 The problem was that they were talking to the
small choir of a law review audience - a closed-circuit of like-
minded colleagues along with a few practitioners creating new al-
phabet agencies in Washington, D.C.
The first scholar to go on record with the implications of the
limited audience range of the law review system was Fred Rodell of
Yale Law School who responded by conducting his career as a Pub-
lic Intellectual. He made his intentions known by repudiating law
review publication in Goodbye to Law Reviews39 - "perhaps the
most widely read - and most controversial - article in all of legal
literature."40 Rodell took no captives as he described the skulldug-
gery of a loose conspiracy of law professors and students exploiting
law reviews to perpetrate the spread of what he deemed "spinach"
on the profession. 41 Relying on "pedantic wheezes" 42 academics
squabble "among themselves over the meaning or content of some
obscure principle that nine judges out of ten would not even recog-
nize if it hopped up and slugged them in the face." 43 With disdain
Rodell signed off. "I do not care to contribute further to the qualita-
tively moribund ... literature of the law."44
He made his point by becoming a journalist, writing articles
for a wide range of publications, including the New Republic, Es-
quire, The Progressive, and the New York Times. Lawrence Spi-
vak, the editor of American Mercury, called him "a first rate, hard-
See A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and
the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632 (1981).
38. See ARTHUR AUSTIN, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: OUTSIDERS AND THE
STRUGGLE OVER LEGAL EDUCATION 33-62 (1998).
39. See Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936).
40. David M. Margolick, Always the Rebel, NAT'L L.J., May 5, 1980, at 24; see
G. Beth Packert, Note, The Relentless Realist: Fred Rodell's Life and Writings,
1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 823 (1984).
41. Rodell, supra note 39, at 45 ("Maybe one of these days the law reviews, or
some of them, will have the nerve to shoot for higher stakes. Maybe they will get
tired of pitching pennies, and of dolling themselves up in tailcoats to do it so that
they feel a sense of importance .... In short, maybe one of these days the law
reviews will catch on. Meanwhile, I say they're spinach."). For the meaning of
"spinach," see Packert, supra note 40, at 825 n.19.
42. Rodell, supra note 39, at 40.
43. Id. at 43.
44. Id. at 38. A promise he broke. See, e.g., Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Re-
views - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962).
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working and careful journalist."45 Rodell favored biographical
profiles of judges and political figures which gave him the opportu-
nity to exult those who stood up for liberal values while adhering
to the realist school of law.46 It also gave him a chance to take a
few swipes at the "mish-mashy mumblings" and "restrained hand-
wringings" of "languid liberals" like Adlai Stevenson and his "sub-
sachem" Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.4 7 And he could be downright
mean; he called William Buckley's God and Man at Yale a "barba-
rian bleat... muddled, dishonest, inaccurate, sloppily argued, and
dull."
48
What defined Rodell as the first Postmodern Public Intellec-
tual was his aesthetic range - long before the critical race move-
ment49 and imitators, he published narrative,50 parody, 51 and even
threw in bawdy limericks. 52 He also anticipated the notion that
the medium is the message by conducting a class in Public Opinion
and the Law designed to teach non-lawyers how to write on law
topics, which produced "the first crop of [American] legal
journalists."53
Rodell's career epitomized the risks of preferring the combat of
undisciplined public dialogue over the peer determined authority
of the academy. It was one thing to amuse one's colleagues with
45. Margolick, supra note 40, at 24 (quoting Lawrence Spivak). He was also a
special feature writer for the Chicago Times (1940) and served on Fortune's board
of editors (1937). Packert, supra note 40, at 825 n.22, 835 n.121.
46. Packert, supra note 40, at 835-38.
47. Fred Rodell, Our Languid Liberals, THE PROGRESSIVE, Mar. 1957, at 5.
48. Fred Rodell, That Book About Yale: The Attack on Free Universities, THE
PROGRESSIVE, Feb. 1952, at 14.
49. See infra notes 165-88 and accompanying text.
50. See Fred Rodell, My Debt to the Town Drunk, READER'S DIGEST, Nov. 1941,
at 54-55.
51. See Fred Rodell, Ah, Scholarship, THE PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1956, at 12.
52. There was a young lady from Yale
Whose price was tattooed on her tail;
But from above and behind
For those who were blind
The same was emblazoned in Braille.
RODELL REVISITED: SELECTED WRITINGS OF FRED RODELL 260 (Loren Ghiglione et
al. eds., 1994).
53. Including Victor Navasky, Philip Shrag, Jeff Greenfield, and Sidney Zion.
See Margolick, supra note 40 (Margolick was also a class member). It was Zion
who no doubt under Rodell's influence, complained that "[als character builders,
law reviews rank a cut above high-class bordellos." Sidney Zion, Burger's War, VIL-
LAGE VOICE, Feb. 4, 1980, at 39, 41 (reviewing Boa WOODWARD & SCOTT ARM-
STRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979)).
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Goodbye to Law Reviews, which could be read as an in-house joke -
perhaps a rebuke to snot-nosed student editors - but to direct trai-
torous criticism on institutional values in the popular press pushed
the envelope over the edge. Instead of following the friendly advice
of good friend and former colleague, William Douglas to "stay on
and bore from within,"54 Rodell opted to play the nasty gadfly and
"chronic malcontent" 55 in the irresponsible public press. Harold
Laski called him the "Walter Winchell of the law schools."56 Ulti-
mately exiled to an upper floor garret office, which "only a blood-
hound could have found,"57 he suffered the indignity of never
getting a chair as colleagues "got calluses on their knees praying
that he would drop dead."58
III. LAW AND ECONOMICS AS THE SOURCE OF THE LAW ACADEMY
PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL
A. The Stealth Factor
The most consequential revision of legal scholarship came
through the Law and Economics movement. Overcoming strong
resistance from liberal traditionalism, the lingering influence of
the Realists, 59 and reluctant courts, it became "the most important
thing in legal education since the birth of Harvard Law School." 60
The catalyst for change came from Posner's Economic Analysis of
Law,6l which applied various economic principles - price, choice,
and opportunity cost - to problems of resource distribution. The
appointment of numerous law and economics academics to the fed-
eral bench assured a permanence that previous movements
54. RODELL REVISITED, supra note 52, at xviii.
55. Id. at xxx.
56. Id. at xxxv.
57. Margolick, supra note 40, at 24.
58. RODELL REVISITED, supra note 52, at xix.
59. See Robert Krulwich, Eggs, Friends and Economics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
1988, § 7 (Book Review) at 47 (reviewing GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UN-
REGULATED ECONOMIST (1988)) (Rodell would have gone berserk over the use of
trashy little equations that "place an equal value on eggs and friends.").
60. Paul Barrett, A Movement Called "Law and Economics" Sways Legal Cir-
cles, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1 (quoting Bruce A. Ackerman, Professor, Co-
lumbia University Law School).
61. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972) [hereinafter Eco.
NOMIC ANALYSIS].
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lacked.62 What went unnoticed and unanticipated was that the
movement would serve as a stealth vehicle for the entry of Public
Intellectual dialogue into the law journals.
To the casual observer it looks like conventional linear doctri-
nal text - and it is. But the stealth factor is in the subject matter.
As Posner decrees: "Economics is the science of human choice in a
world in which resources are limited in relation to human
wants .... ,,63 For the Law and Economics type, this is a broad
directive that includes topics such as sex, virginity, and the der-
egulation of adoption.64 What followed was the publication in the
mainstream law reviews by supporters and opponents of a wide-
ranging Public Intellectual discourse over law, politics, and the
economy, amongst other subjects.
On a mission to gain a dominant voice in the Law Academy,
the Law and Economics advocates adopted Nobel Prize winner
George Stigler's strategy: maximize the market for your ideas by
circulating wave after wave of scholarship to force the opposition
into a defensive posture in which they re-circulate your argu-
ments.6 5 The strategy worked, spreading the Economics coalition
throughout the academy as the law !reviews shoved conventional
doctrine aside to publish the latest application of economics to a
new problem. The more problematical the issue, the more atten-
tion it received. As the leader of the movement, and "because he
has an uncommon taste and talent for controversy"66 Richard Pos-
ner is the main lightening rod for criticism - even inciting radical
nontraditional adventures in legal scholarship.67
62. Deborah Graham, Conservative Academics: Rising Stars, LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1985, at 1 ("The Reagan administration's appointment of venerated con-
servative scholars to judgeships or administration posts has opened the way for
other law school academicians to gain greater prominence and influence as intel-
lectual gurus of both the administration and the New Right.").
63. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 61, at 1.
64. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON
(1992).
65. GEORGE STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 67 (1988)
("The new ideas will normally require much repetition, elaboration, and, desirably,
controversy, for controversy is an attention getter and sometimes a thought
getter.").
66. Gertrude Himmelfarb, Judging Richard Posner, COMMENTARY, Feb. 2002,
at 37.
67. See infra Part III.B.
2003] THE LAW ACADEMY PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL 253
B. As a Cover
One of the more popular tactics is to use literature as the dra-
matic cover for critical advocacy. Robin West capitalized on this
genre by using Franz Kafka's The Hunger Artist as a double for the
"ultimate Posnerian entrepreneur"68 who, by starving himself in
public for money, "depicts a perfectly functioning Posnerian com-
mercial market that leaves old preferences satiated at every mo-
ment of autonomous choice." 69 It was an ingenious play on Kafka's
byzantine imagination to mock Posner's totalitarian economics
that idealizes individualism while abhorring intervention. 70 What
in Posner's world view is respect for individualism becomes, under
West's use of The Hunger Artist, an expression of moral corruption.
The next adventure demonstrated Law and Economics' power
to erode doctrinal style as well as substance. The linear style, dat-
ing back to the scientific realism of Langdell's casebook method
and institutionalized by the Harvard Law Review, was the remain-
ing tradition of legal scholarship. 71 Using the ubiquitous Franz
Kafka's short story The Metamorphosis as the guiding script, Pro-
fessor D'Amato morphs a law professor into a thousand-legged
cockroach 72 who, confined to his room, must haggle with his sister
for necessities. 73 The professor/cockroach copes by resorting to ba-
sic Posnerian economics: he daily calculates the opportunity costs
of staying in bed and losing working time (money), barters schol-
68. Robin West, Authority Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV.
384, 393 (1985).
69. Id. at 394.
70. Posner's response: "It [The Hunger Artist] may be about many things. But
only superficially is it about hunger, poverty, the pitfalls of entrepreneurship, and
the fickleness of consumers." RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUN-
DERSTOOD RELATION 180-81 (1988). None of the literary critics support West's in-
terpretation. See Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politically Correct Law Review
Articles, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 233, 262 n.217 (1999).
71. Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding,
and Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739
(1985).
72. In the Kafka story "he is a divided creature, split, a halfway creature,
something that oscillates between animal and man, that could become completely
animal or return to being man and does not have the strength for a complete meta-
morphosis." PIETRO CITATI, KAFKA 64 (1989).
73. Anthony D'Amato, As Gregor Samas Awoke One Morning from Uneasy
Dreams He Found Himself Transformed into an Economic Analyst of Law, 83 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1012 (1989).
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arly treatises with his sister for food (he developed an assembly
line method by substituting a new topic without changing a word),
while trying to educate his mother on utility by reference to supply
and demand curves (who unsympathetically says: "But that isn't a
curve. It's two straight lines like an X.") 74 After unmasking the
professor/cockroach as Posner, D'Amato concludes that it is "all
just so much authoritarian bullshit . .. .75
IV. THE RICOCHET EFFECT
A. Lasson's Update of Rodell
In 1990, Ken Lasson, a professor at Baltimore Law School, up-
dated Fred Rodell's criticisms by noting the consequences of two
new factors: one, the ascendancy of a publish or perish require-
ment was forcing a deluge of manuscripts on the student-run law
reviews and, two, the deluge was mostly slop; "a gargantuan souf-
fl of airy irrelevance."76 Since Lasson wrote his piece the problem
has been exacerbated by the appearance of more - and more - stu-
dent-operated journals, assuring the continuation of a steady diet
of scholarship souffl6, radical babble, and high school journalism.7 7
There was another lesson in the Professor's article: by the
1990s the law journal system constituted a vehicle for the delivery
of whatever the professoriate wanted to say. From the Harvard
Law Review, which, after publishing Lasson's article, introduced
the "F" and "C" words, 78 to the Wisconsin Women's Law Journal
where Robin West discussed her promiscuity, 79 every law professor
was assured of getting his or her whimsies, pain or indignations, in
print. However, at least one professor has observed, "I am not sure
that we have reached the point where you could jot something
down on a cocktail napkin and get it published....-"8 o There was a
74. Id. at 1013.
75. Anthony D'Amato, Gregor Samas Replies, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 1022, 1025
(1989).
76. Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and
Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926, 927 (1990).
77. AUSTIN, supra note 38, at 75-77.
78. Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished
Draft), 105 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1072 (1992).
79. Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Liues: A Phenomenologi-
cal Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WiS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987).
80. Charles Rothfeld, A Lament: Too Few Interesting Law Articles, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1990, at B23 (quoting John Nowak, Professor, Illinois Law School).
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more significant trend; the law reviews, especially the top tier
"elite" journals, became a sounding board for "push the envelope
theories,"8 ' advocacy, and fun. In the process they become con-
duits for getting notice - and currency - in the popular media.82 In
other words, a ricochet effect: from law review to mainstream me-
dia. Lasson's article proves the point; the Washington Post83 and
New York Times8 4 gave his career a boost with positive profiles,
paving the way for a Public Intellectual career had he wanted to
commit.
"Eleven years ago, a man held an ice pick to my throat and
said: 'Push over, shut up, or I'll kill you.' I did what he said, but I
couldn't stop crying. A hundred years later, I jumped out of the car
as he drove away." 5 This could have been a police report or the
beginning of a tell-all memoir. Rather, it was the first sentence in
Susan Estrich's Yale Law Journal article Rape. The violence of the
encounter forced the reader to confront the author's personal expe-
rience of coping with a criminal justice system that lets its rape
victims fall through the cracks into the unpardonable contradic-
tion: "If it isn't my fault, why am I supposed to be ashamed?" 6
Yale's flexible non-doctrinal law review attitude gave Estrich
the discretion to set up - to "pose" - her critical judgments in a
manner unacceptable under the protocols of "serious" scholarly
journals. It is the best of two worlds - stark and brutal drama
leading the reader into standard analytical evaluation. Estrich ex-
ercised the instincts of the Public Intellectual by converting the
article into a book,87 building her public persona (syndicated col-
81. Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86
MICH. L. REv. 1835, 1904 (1988) ("Contemporary legal scholars are now generally
aware that their work consists of recommendations addressed to legal decision-
makers, recommendations that are ultimately derived from value judgments
rather than objective truth.").
82. This fact tends to push doctrinal work to lower-ranked law reviews.
"What does seem clear is that doctrinal scholarship has been moving from the
leading law schools to the law schools of the second and third tiers." Richard A.
Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1647, 1654-55 (1993).
83. Paul W. Valentine, Md. Professor Fires Darts at Stuffy Law Reviews;
Harvard Runs Critique of Legal 'Manure,' WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1990, at B3.
84. See Rothfeld, supra note 80.
85. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1087 (1986).
86. Id. at 1089.
87. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1986).
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umnist, radio talk show host, political advisor, and law professor)s8
to make Posner's Top 100 List - at 57th she was one above Susan
Sontag: a classic ricochet success story.
B. The Instant Public Intellectual
The Public Intellectual produces dialogue on subjects of inter-
est to the general public. Academics have to negotiate the narrow
gates of peer-supervised journals - except for law professors who
communicate through student-edited8 9 journals that consciously
publish material that does not address the problems of its primary
constituency of lawyers and judges.90 Problem-solving is eschewed
in favor of producing work that resonates, transforms, and
politicizes. 91 It is a selection policy that accounts for the instant
Public Intellectual.
When the Duke Law Journal published Professor Madeline
Morris's sociological study of rape in the military, she instantly be-
came a nationally recognized voice on the feminization of the
armed forces. 92 To explain a finding that in certain situations mili-
tary rape incidents exceeded civilian rapes,93 Morris identified cul-
88. See SUSAN ESTRICH, SEX AND POWER (2000); SUSAN ESTRICH, MAKING THE
CASE FOR YOURSELF: A DIET BOOK FOR SMART WOMEN (1998).
89. While generally ignoring this problem, many faculty nevertheless agree
that "student edited journals are the scandal of legal publishing . . . ." Patricia
Bellew Gray, Harvard's Faculty Stirs a Tempest With Plans for New Law Journal,
WALL ST. J., May 28, 1986, at 37.
90. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992) ("Too many law professors
are ivory tower dilettantes, pursuing whatever subject piques their interest,
whether or not the subject merits scholarship, and whether or not they have the
scholarly skills to master it."); see also Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use
of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659, 688
(1998) (demonstrating "that modern legal scholarship is losing touch with the
practice of law").
91. David Barnhizer, Freedom to Do What? Institutional Neutrality, Aca-
demic Freedom, and Academic Responsibility, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 346, 354 (1993)
("The revolution in legal scholarship has not been coherent or always substantive
as much as it has been political. Many law faculty are pursuing personal intellec-
tual and political agendas beneath the umbrella of legal scholarship. In the pro-
cess, intellectual curiosity and vision have often been subordinated to desired
consequence.").
92. See Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture,
45 DUKE L.J. 651 (1996).
93. Id. at 653 (noting that "the ratio of military rape rates to civilian rape
rates is substantially larger than the ratio of military rates to civilan rates of other
violent crime").
2003] THE LAW ACADEMY PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL 257
tural conditions evoking and exulting masculinity as the causative
source.94 Her solution: immerse the military with the moderating
effects of the female presence (including combat), eliminate the
"kill the enemy" masculinist attitude, and instill "idealism and
moral conviction of a shared cause."95
Morris's article on a new policy of cultural change for combat
ignited a firefight between old line militarists, feminists, conserva-
tives, and liberals, over the role of women in the future of the mili-
tary.96 Instead of advocating a new set of laws, Morris resonated
to the public by seeking to transform the military tradition with a
completely new culture. She got what every Public Intellectual rel-
ishes - attention and criticism. And she likewise got recognition as
a player;97 another ricochet success.
C. Cross-Elasticity of Demand
The economist views the relationship between doctrinal schol-
arship and Public Intellectual dialogue as an exercise in supply
and demand dictated by cross-elasticity of demand.98 As dissimi-
lar products, a drop in the supply of legal scholarship will not af-
fect the demand for the Public Intellectual work. Twenty years ago
people who read the Atlantic Monthly would not gravitate to the
Harvard Law Review if the Atlantic ceased publication. But in to-
day's market, the economist would have to factor in the possibility
of competition between nontraditional legal scholarship and Public
Intellectual media. As proof of a growing cross-elasticity of de-
94. Id. at 701-02 ("In essence, normative standards of masculinity that em-
phasize aggressiveness, dominance, and independence, and that minimize sensi-
tivity, gentleness, and other stereotypically feminine characteristics have been
found to be associated with heightened propensity to commit rape.").
95. Id. at 753 (noting that the military should emulate "religious orders, Com-
munist Party cells, the French resistance underground, and even Alcoholics
Anonymous").
96. Hanna Rosin observed that "the military is not a faculty lounge" while
wondering how the "U.S. Army [wound] up in bra-burning territory." Hanna Rosin,
Sleeping with the Enemy, NEW REPUBLIC, June 23, 1997, at 20.
97. Morris was appointed consultant on gender issues to Togo West, Jr., Army
Secretary, to which a critic said: "The entire article might be dismissed as inconse-
quential as well as fatuous, except that her ideological theories might become offi-
cial policy through Secretary West . . . ." Elaine Donnelly, Social Fiction in the
Ungendered Military, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 1997, at A16.
98. See ECONOMIC ANALYSiS, supra note 61, at 121-24.
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mand between the two markets the economist should consider the
odyssey of Paul Butler's Racially Based Jury Nullification. 99
Successful Public Intellectuals seize opportunity. After a se-
ries of controversial verdicts involving people such as Bernhard
Goetz, William Kennedy Smith, Lorena Bobbitt, Rodney King, the
Menendez brothers, and O.J. Simpson 00 - Paul Butler, a professor
at the George Washington University Law School, seized on jury
nullification to argue that "it is the moral responsibility of black
jurors to emancipate some guilty black outlaws." 101 Assuming the
adverse effects of a white-controlled capitalistic market system
that compels young black men into crime and incarceration, nullifi-
cation is the rational form of self-help that can temper justice with
reality. 10 2
One of the instant celebrity talking heads, Greta Van Sus-
teren, said that Butler's proposal would lead to "anarchy,"103 while
a New York Times editorial called his arguments "troubling" and
went on to comment that "[t]he criminal justice system is certainly
imperfect, but this sort of wrecking is not the way to fiX it."104 Pro-
fessor Randall Kennedy of Harvard Law School wrote that Butler
99. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Crimi-
nal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
100. See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWrTZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE (1994) (arguing
for the abandonment of excuses and the reinstatement of personal accountability);
SUSAN ESTRICH, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER (1988) (discussing how politics is
destroying the criminal justice system). These trials produced a media circus of
lawyer-commentators who, according to the president of the American Bar Associ-
ation "pimp their dubious talents and hustle the public." Gail D. Cox, Bushnell:
O.J. Commentators Are '$2 Hookers,' NAT'L L.J., June 12, 1995, at A4.
101. Butler, supra note 99, at 679.
102. Id. at 693-94. Butler comments:
Some property crimes committed by blacks may be understood as an inev-
itable result of the tension between the dominant societal message equat-
ing possession of material resources with success and happiness and the
power of white supremacy to prevent most African-Americans from ac-
quiring enough of those resources in a legal manner.
Id. Given economic inequalities, Butler "encourages" nullification of theft from the
"very wealthy." Id. at 722.
103. Burden of Proof with Greta Van Susteren (CNN television broadcast, Jan.
15, 1996) (Transcript No. 76 on file with author).
104. When the Jurors Ignore the Law, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1997, at
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"gives voice to erroneous claims, dubious calculations, and destruc-
tive sentiments." 10 5
Like Estrich, Butler got maximum ricochet publication effects
from the Yale piece on the way to achieving Public Intellectual sta-
tus. He appeared on 60 Minutes, jousted with the panel on Jesse
Jackson's Equal Time and with the pugnacious host on Geraldo, in
addition to attracting extensive newspaper coverage. According to
his faculty profile he writes a monthly column for the Legal Times
(Washington, D.C.) and is a frequent commentator on CNN and
National Public Radio. 10 6 Perhaps most significantly, Butler
demonstrated a positive level of cross-elasticity of demand between
legal scholarship and Public Intellectual media by abridging his
Yale article for publication in Harper's Magazine.'0 7 It was an
easy transition; eliminate the footnotes and tighten the syntax to
compel the audience to give it a serious reading. The unintended
consequence was that Butler used the Yale Law Journal to under-
mine doctrinalism with the counterpunching subjective style of the
Public Intellectual. In replying to critics Butler describes the con-
text of his strategy:
In the Christian faith tradition of many African Americans,
preachers sometimes describe an epistemology of "knowing
what you know." Knowing what you know refers to those be-
liefs, often emotional, that are at the core of one's being and
that precede or subvert education and other formal ways of
knowing .... Knowing what you know gives law review edi-
tors headaches because it does not lend itself to formal
citation. 0 8
V. THE OUTSIDER MOVEMENT
A. Origins
The most far reaching spike for the Public Intellectual move-
ment in the Law Academy came from the Outsider collaboration of
105. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 299 (1997). For a more
extensive criticism, see Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nulli-
fication: A Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. REV. 109 (1996).
106. See faculty profile of Paul Butler, at http://www.law.gwu.edu/fac/pro-
file.asp?ID=1723 (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
107. Paul Butler, Black Jurors: Right to Acquit?, HARPER'S MAG., Dec. 1995, at
11.
108. Paul Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Justice: A Reply, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 143, 143-44 (1996).
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feminists and minorities. As participants in the on-going general
advocacy, feminists saturated both journals and mass print with
criticism of white male oppression in legal education, often focus-
ing on the Socratic Method. 10 9 Their role in introducing the femi-
nist translation of Postmodernism to legal education received
certification in the 1988 Symposium, Women in Legal Education" °
endorsing "Feminist models which depend on teaching for empow-
erment ... and sharing experiences, rather than by attack....""'
For feminism it was a major gesture, for Postmodernism it was a
crack in the door. While feminists continued to speak in a linear
voice in the law journals to genderize a Public Intellectual dia-
logue, 112 other Outsiders were exercising a strategy to subvert
109. Emily M. Bernstein, Law School Women Question the Teaching, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 1996, at B0; see Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's
Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1994). See gener-
ally Elizabeth Mertz et al., What Difference Does Difference Make? The Challenge
for Legal Education, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1998) (discussing findings from an ob-
servational study of law school teaching methods).
So the answer to the question whether women and men, or students of
different race or class backgrounds, are the "same" or "different" appears
to be yes: they are the same in some respects and different in others - and,
indeed, some of them are under given circumstances more the same or
different than others.
Id. at 86.
110. Symposium, Women in Legal Education - Pedagogy, Law, Theory and
Practice, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1988).
111. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies,
and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61,
81 (1988).
112. Cynthia Bowman's Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of
Women, 106 HARV L. REV. 517 (1993), exemplifies this genre. Bowman proposed
fining "street harassers" $250, id. at 541, and to give "the target[s] of harassment,"
id. at 568, a private cause of action including punitive damages. Id. at 575-76.
Calculated to attract attention, it did so with comments like "staring at a stranger
is a well-established cultural taboo." Id. at 526. It produced a furor. See, e.g., Joan
Beck, "Street Harassment" is Offensive, but Should it Be a Crime?, CHi. TRIB., Mar.
11, 1993, Perspective, at 23 ("Maybe the foolish fringes of the political correctness
movement have overloaded our mental circuits."); Nina Burleigh, Tar, Feather
Men Who Harass Women on Street, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 10, 1993, at Fl ("For the
guys who harass and humiliate women, there's an old response to misdemeanors:
public humiliation. A few days in the stocks, being gawked at or squirming in tar
and feathers while we laugh, would be rehabilitative."); Peter Calamai, Freedom of
Expression Is Always in a Perilous State, CALGARY HERALD, Apr. 5, 1993, at A5
("And even the worst male chauvinist would not wish a daughter, sister or wife
subjected to the sort of public sexual taunts that reduce women to a piece of meat.
Yet should we send people to jail - people too poor to pay a fine - for saying some-
thing that is neither overtly obscene ("Hi, gorgeous?") nor (as Bowman concedes)
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what they viewed as an oppressive, exclusionary-dominant Law
Academy.
The mainstream media recognized the work of Black Public
Intellectuals in 1995 when the Atlantic Monthly compared them to
the New York intellectuals of the 1930s-40s - the Partisan Review
crowd. 113 They differ from the Partisan crowd in two ways; they
are obsessed with race rather than socialism, and they use their
university connections to "extend their influence beyond the acad-
emy."1" 4 Included among the list of newly-anointed was a cluster
of law professors: Stephen Carter of Yale, Randall Kennedy of
Harvard, Lani Guinier of Harvard, Patricia Williams of Columbia,
and Derrick Bell of New York University (retired).
All five were, and continue to be, fully accredited under Pos-
ner's criteria; they use mass circulation media to address current
issues to a general audience. They are succinct, "opinionated,
judgmental, sometimes condescending, and often waspish." 115 For
those expecting a unified Black agenda, forget about it - they offer
puzzlement and discountenance. The fluster comes from a lively
debate between Universalists and Authenticists. 116 The former,
reflecting the views of Carter and Kennedy tend to blend reliance
on the analytical, critical, and objectivity ideals of the University
intended to injure?"); A Move to Protect Women from 'Street Harassment,' N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 1993, at D19 ("Some consider it playful banter, even a form of flirta-
tion. But to a growing number of women, there is nothing playful about sexual
comments, catcalls and whistles from strangers on the street.").
113. See Robert S. Boynton, The New Intellectuals, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1995, at 53; Michael Hanchard, Intellectual Pursuit, Tm NATION, Feb. 19, 1996, at
22.
114. Boynton, supra note 113, at 56; see also Bryon P. White & Ron Grossman,
Black Intelligentsia Invisible No More; African-American Scholars Are the New
Media Darlings, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 1995, at 1 (discussing the interjection of black
thinkers such as Lani Guiner, Stephen Carter, and Cornel West in the popular
media).
115. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 35.
116. Boynton, supra note 113, at 56 ("Surprisingly, given their newfound prom-
inence, a number of contemporary black thinkers who aspire to be public intellec-
tuals find themselves in a genuine quandary. Having distinguished themselves by
their analysis of racial subjects, they must now widen their scope and address
broader political questions; having received accolades as academic specialists, they
must now address a general audience. Secure in their place at the center of main-
stream intellectual culture, they must now endure the criticisms of those who ac-
cuse them of having shed their 'authentic' minority identification and of selling
out. Today's African-American public intellectuals are juggling a dizzying number
of often conflicting identities and allegiances.").
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culture with the shared Black ethos to seek a cross cultural dia-
logue. As Authenticists, Bell, Williams, and Guinier, project the
presence of a unique Black experience that endows Black scholars
with the exclusive right to relate important stories - "stories that
cannot be sincerely told by their privileged majoritarian peers." 117
As newcomers to legal education the Authenticists were forced
to deal with a law review orthodoxy that sought to coerce them
with an "either-or" option: either write on a conventional topic in
doctrinal style - or hit the bricks. 118 This meant publishing in an
Outsider "alternative journal" - and damage tenure chances or do
what most did - play the Insider game, get tenure, and then raise
hell. 119 Recognizing that they were being squeezed to the periph-
ery and were denied the opportunity to become a valid presence in
the dominant discourse, the Outsiders decided to shell shock the
Law Academy with stories by people with privileged access to their
culture, race, and gender.
It was Derrick Bell who surmised that capitulation to the dom-
inant authoritarian doctrinal discourse would be fatal to the Out-
sider presence. "When it was over and I was walking back to my
office, my only thought was: what the hell is going on? Whatever it
was, it was not a law review article." 120 That is my memory of the
effect of Bell's reading to our faculty an advance copy of the Civil
Rights Chronicles, a series of allegories that the Harvard Law Re-
117. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 2038
(1991).
118. Jon Wiener, Law Profs Fight the Power: Minority Legal Scholars, THE NA-
TION, Sept. 4, 1998, at 248 ("The debate is about voice ... about making everybody
speak one language .... The whole idea of the dominant legal discourse is to limit
the range of what you can express, the range of argument you can make.") (quoting
Richard Delgado).
119. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 561 (1984) ("When I began teaching law
in the mid-1970's, I was told by a number of well-meaning senior colleagues to
'play things straight' in my scholarship-to establish a reputation as a scholar in
some mainstream legal area and not get too caught up in civil rights or other 'eth-
nic' subjects. Being young, impressionable, and anxious to succeed, I took their
advice to heart and, for the first six years of my career, produced a steady stream
of articles, book reviews, and the like, impeccably traditional in substance and
form. The dangers my friends warned me about were averted; the benefits ac-
crued. Tenure securely in hand, I turned my attention to civil rights law and
scholarship.").
120. AUSTIN, supra note 38, at 124-25.
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view published as a preface to the 1985 Supreme Court edition.121
I put the event aside as one of those inexplicable puzzles until sev-
eral years later when I read that Derrick's next allegory blew up
the entire Harvard Black faculty along with President Bok. 122
Bell, as co-author of a report on minority hiring, had substituted
his own allegorical version of a mysterious explosion, forcing recog-
nition of Harvard's hiring tokenism and a system that refused to
accept the uniqueness of Black scholarship. When I next encoun-
tered Bell I knew his objective: the use of narrative allegory as the
symbol of racial exclusion and to portray the role of Blacks as
"scapegoats."123 It was a subject that required a "broader perspec-
tive ... that a traditional doctrinal discussion of cases"124 lacked,
requiring the use of narrative. "[You can use illustrations that are
fantastical to illustrate, and I think illustrate more effectively,
that which you believe is real but not much accepted." 125
The "either-or" ostracism by the elite student journals ceased
when the Michigan Law Review published a symposium on Legal
Storytelling.126 The justification for the radical change was
couched in an ironical twist of the doctrinalists thirst for logic: how
can you exclude narrative work without an objective comparison?
"If the objectivists account is one point of view among many (and
not point-of-viewers as against other point-of-view accounts), then
one needs some other account explaining why it shall be privileged,
if indeed it is to be."127 Hence the logical conclusion: systematic
exclusion - "either-or" - undermines credibility.
121. Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights
Chronicles, 99 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1985).
122. See Harvard Blacks Make Unusual Plea on Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1988, § 1 at 27. When asked about Bok's reaction to his allegory, Bell replied:
Derek Bok was not pleased. So we went to meet with him. And he said,
"What were you trying to do?" And I said: "We were trying to help you get
this affirmative action thing up on the agenda for discussion." And he
said: "Well, you don't have to blow me up." Kind of missed the whole
point.
Arthur Austin, Narrative Writing as Legal Scholarship: An Interview with Derrick
Bell, IN BRIEF, CASE W. REs. L. ALUMNI MAG., Sept. 1992, at 3, 6.
123. Austin, supra note 122, at 4.
124. Id. at 3.
125. Id. at 4.
126. Kim Lane Scheppele, Forward: Telling Stories, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2073
(1989).
127. Id. at 2091.
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This was, however, the only concession to logic. A who's-who
of narrative genre authors delivered variations on the privileged
Insider "we" vs. the Outsider "they" as marginalized oppressed au-
thors. Patricia Williams introduced the story of the sausage ma-
chine to demonstrate the "word-entanglements" 128  of the
oppressive privileged language. Bell reprised his explosion alle-
gory to flush out the intransigence of white supremacy.129 Profes-
sor Matsuda used the experience of hate speech to explain the
unique relevance of Outsider Jurisprudence. 130 Richard Delgado,
whose letter provoked the symposium, summed up the Outsider's
prevailing objective: "The stories of outgroups aim to subvert that
ingroup reality."131
An aggressive rebuttal came from Stephen Carter and Randall
Kennedy, the two Universalist law professors included in the At-
lantic Monthly's list of Black elite Public Intellectuals. 3 2 After
discounting the assumed intimidating and exclusionary effects of a
"majoritarian perspective,"13 3 Carter invoked the hard logic and
neutrality of patentability as the proper reference for evaluation of
legal scholarship. Neither methodology, dialect, or style, is rele-
vant to the ultimate issue of ratifying merit under the decree that
"the argument must be new, meaning that it has not been said
before" 134 and that the work "increase human knowledge."135 The
ultimate question of whether, objectively, the work is distinctive is
determined by the non-obviousness of the problem or the solution
to the relevant community of scholars.
By taking head-on the racial identity scholarship movement,
Professor Randall Kennedy energized the debate. 136 Challenging
128. Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal
Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2118, 2131 (1989).
129. See Derrick Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2382 (1989).
130. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2326 (1989).
131. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2411, 2413 (1989).
132. See Boynton, supra note 113 and accompanying text.
133. Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and "White-Male" Standards: Some
Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065, 2075 (1991).
134. Id. at 2085.
135. Id. at 2080.
136. Warned not to publish his criticism, Kennedy replied:
Avoiding a public challenge to the racial critiques I have focused upon
facilitates acceptance of theories and styles of thought that are seriously
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Bell, Delgado, and Matsuda, Kennedy rejected their core assump-
tion that the White culture, as hegemony of "Imperial Scholars,"
intentionally silences minority scholarship while denying the
rightful entitlement of Black scholarship as presumptuously dis-
tinctive. Expecting the standard doctrinal arguments from the
Outsiders derived from facts and analysis, Kennedy instead de-
tected "poetic license,"137 imagination rather than facts, "mere as-
sertion"138 and arguments "with little specificity,"139 rather than
serious logic chopping. On the relevance of the Insider-Outsider
characterization, he said:
Rather, the point is that distance or nearness to a given sub-
ject - "outsiderness" or "insiderness" - are simply social con-
ditions; they provide opportunities that intellectuals are free
to use or squander, but they do not in themselves determine
the intellectual quality of scholarly productions - that de-
pends on what a particular scholar makes of his or her mater-
ials, regardless of his or her social position. 140
Kennedy and Carter persuasively flushed out the subjective
and seemingly self-serving theories of the Outsiders, a thorough
response rendered with cachet as the work of two Authenticist
Black Public Intellectuals. At this point, the doctrinalist could rea-
sonably assume that the issue was settled - logic trumps narra-
tive. Given their subsequent behavior, they did make that
assumption and it was a mistake. Within the decade of the 90s,
the storytelling culture would, for a convoy of reasons, re-orient
legal scholarship.
While the Insiders were confidently passive, the Outsiders, in-
censed over the perceived disloyalty of the Kennedy/Carter am-
bush, initiated their own blitzkrieg. Outsider literature, in the
presence of stories and critical assessments, underscored by the
crusade of Richard Delgado, became a familiar refrain in the jour-
flawed, detrimental in effect, but nonetheless influential within important
sectors of legal academia. In this case, keeping quiet is far more damag-
ing than taking the risk that some of my ideas will be misappropriated.
Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques in Legal Academia, 102 HARV, L. REv. 1745,
1812 (1989).
137. Id. at 1763.
138. Id. at 1765.
139. Id. at 1775.
140. Id. at 1795.
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nals. As a chorus, the Voice movement 141 adopted Public Intellec-
tual techniques to attest to the growing audience of young Tenured
Radical faculty. 142 Most importantly, the Outsider culture meshed
with and reinforced Postmodernism as it infiltrated the Law
Academy.
B. Telling Stories to Subvert Ingroup Reality and "Reallocate
Power"
The Outsiders succeeded. While not with a deluge, the volume
in numbers, defiance, and political instinct, was sufficient to signal
the demise of the doctrinal stranglehold. When the Duke Law
Journal published an autobiographical narrative entitled A Hair
Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender,143 the
window was cracked for the scholarship of emotion and self. Nar-
rative was universalized: everything is a story and "[jludges, as
storyteller, tell their audience that something happened." 144 Thus,
readers are entitled to their own deconstructed interpretation. 145
As David Lodge's fictional Morris Zapp said; "It's kind of exciting -
the last intellectual thrill left. Like sawing through the branch
you're sitting on."14 6
Professor Richard Epstein argued that the "new voices" of law
narrative contributed "nothing to the debate" other than the "con-
stant, repetitive assertion of their own relevance." 47 He was cor-
141. Voice movement refers to a presumption of black exclusivity to relate the
black experience. See Johnson, supra note 117; AUSTIN, supra note 38, at 116-19.
142. The term "Tenured Radical" is attributed to Roger Kimball in his book
TENURED RADICALS: How POLITICS HAS CORRUPTED OUR HIGHER EDUCATION
(1990). For a description of the Law Tenured Radical, see John Schlegel, Notes
Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on
Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 406-07 (1984) ("Almost all of the prin-
cipals of the group came to maturity during the late sixties or early seventies.
Most began teaching during these years as well, often after a stint in legal services
or some other reform-oriented post, as well as participation in the antiwar move-
ment. And while dreams of reform faded, the common politics did not; indeed,
many of the principals often moved farther left in an attempt to explain what had
gone wrong with earlier great hopes.").
143. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991).
144. Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REV. 381, 386 (1989).
145. Id. at 400 ("[Rleadings of judicial narratives always diverge as readers'
individual imaginations push them to their own meanings.").
146. DAVID LODGE, SMALL WORLD-AN ACADEMIC ROMANCE 118 (1984).
147. Richard A. Epstein, Legal Education and the Politics of Exclusion, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1607, 1626 (1993). He added: "Even on the issues most relevant to
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rect, but what he missed was that it was an intentional strategy.
In the highly charged aftermath of the Kennedy/Carter fusillade,
the Outsider community produced an extensive range of "asser-
tions" whose objective was to interpret "relevance" as evoking a
significant race and gender cultural divide issue. 148 The strategy
ignited a "public controversy,"149 cutting across multiple interest
groups and generating an open invitation to a Public Intellectual
dialogue.
The relevance of the Voice assertion was its use to subvert doc-
trinalism's Tyranny of Objectivity. 150 For example, when Milner
Ball wrote that the storyteller's objective is to "nudge the language
of law toward art,"151 he was proselytizing the subjectivity of the
reader response process adopted by Kathryn Abrams, a Voice col-
league who posited the ukase that readers, as deconstructionists,
"must teach themselves to discern the unifying threads of non-
linear argument ... ."152
As doctrinalist advocates bemoaned the absence of a guiding
methodology, 153 reason and analysis,' 54 the Outsiders turned up
the volume of the Authenticity assertions. Authenticity refers to
their own concerns, they lack the basic conceptual apparatus necessary for under-
standing." Id.
148. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971
(1991); Milner S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARv. L.
REV. 1855 (1990); Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255
(1994); Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 683 (1992); Johnson, supra note 117; Charles R. Lawrence, III, The
Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231
(1992); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and
Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39 (1991); Shauna Van Praagh, Stories
in Law School: An Essay on Language, Participation, and the Power of Legal Edu-
cation, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111 (1992).
149. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 11.
150. See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay,
95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1376 (1986).
151. Ball, supra note 148, at 1862.
152. Abrams, supra note 148, at 1042.
153. Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth; A Theory for Evaluating Legal Schol-
arship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889, 955-56 (1992) ("Explicit recognition of these exper-
iences in legal scholarship, the willingness to speak in an individual, rather than a
depersonalized, objective voice, could conceivably evolve into a separate method.
But method, as discussed above, consists of an interlinked set of consciously articu-
lated procedures that generates research. To date, narrative has not developed to
this point; it functions as a specific technique for the presentation of substantive
views, not as a comprehensive system that generates its own scholarly approach.
It is not, for example, equivalent to the deconstructive arguments that character-
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what Gates calls a "literary tradition . . . that ethnic or national
identity finds unique expression in literary forms." 155 In other
words, readers can read a book and intuitively discern the author's
race or gender. Gates' article, in which he rejects the authenticity
assertion, 15 6 confirms its status as a public controversy resonating
in history157 and sociology, 158 but most contentiously in race and
gender. For women, Carol Gilligan asserts the natural and exclu-
sive female voice of empathy and nurturing,159 enabling them to
exploit their unique intuitive experiences in scholarship. 16° In an
early challenge to the law's dominant white male culture, Martha
Minow said: "Feminist work has thus named the power of naming
ize critical legal scholarship or to the microeconomic analysis of the Chicago
School.").
154. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School; An Es-
say on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 854 (1993) ("A legal story without
analysis is much like a judicial opinion with 'Findings of Fact' but no 'Conclusions
of Law.'").
155. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., 'Authenticity,' or the Lesson of Little Tree, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1991 § 7 (Book Review), at 26.
156. Id. at 30 ("No human culture is inaccessible to someone who makes the
effort to understand, to learn, to inhabit another world.").
157. See Theodore S. Hamerow, Point of View, Disturbing Echoes of Old Argu-
ments About Ethnic Experience, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. Aug. 4, 1993, at A36 (In
history the parallel is the doctrine of collective experience which assumes that
race, sex, religion, or ethnic background endows the members of that group "with
unique insights or perceptions denied to those outside the group.").
158. Robert K. Merton, Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of
Knowledge, 78 AM. J. Soc. 9, 28 (1972) ("Important as such allowance for individ-
ual variability is for general structural theory, it has particular significance for a
sociological perspective on the life of the mind and the advancement of science and
learning. For it is precisely the individual differences among scientists and schol-
ars that are often central to the development of the discipline. They often involve
the differences between good scholarship and bad; between imaginative contribu-
tions to science and pedestrian ones; between the consequential ideas and stillborn
ones. In arguing for the monopolistic access to knowledge, Insider doctrine can
make no provision for individual variability that extends beyond the boundaries of
the ingroup which alone can develop sound and fruitful ideas.").
159. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); see also Joan M. Shaughnessy, Gilligan's Travels,
7 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3-5 (1988) (describing Carol Gilligan's differentiation between
male and female morality). For an update on the adverse reactions to Gilligan's
work, see Emily Eakin, Listening for the Voices of Women, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2002, at B9; Emily Nussbaum, Ms. Lonelyhearts, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002, § 7
(Book Review), at 14; Margaret Taylor, Teen Angels, NEW REPUBLIC, July 22, 2002,
at 34.
160. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829
(1990).
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and has challenged both the use of male measures and the as-
sumption that women fail by them."1 61 Professor Matsuda identi-
fied a "new epistemological source for critical scholars," their
experiences, culture, and history. 162 She was referring primarily
to the lingering effects of slavery, which imbues Outsider scholar-
ship with a distinctive passion and insight, deserving of a pre-
sumption of expertise. 163 Hence, the ongoing vitality and
resonance of the Public Intellectual controversy over the legiti-
macy of authenticity and the capacity of writers to function as "cul-
tural impersonators." 164
C. Authenticity as a Public Intellectual Theme
[Riacism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible compo-
nent of this society.
-Derrick Bell 165
To speak as black, female, and commercial lawyer has ren-
dered me simultaneously universal, trendy, and marginal.
-Patricia J. Williams' 66
Yet recall the title of this volume: The Coming Race War? The
only question is whether to keep the question mark.
-Richard Delgado167
These quotes symbolize the collective motif that synchronizes
the distinctive perspective of the Outsider as Public Intellectual
qua Authenticist. They filter assertions, frustrations, harangue,
and emotions through "storytelling" to educate and transform.
Their technique produces work that is virtually critic-proof. To
challenge an "agony experience," 68 for example, the critic would
161. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice En-
gendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 61 (1987).
162. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repa-
rations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 325 (1987).
163. Delgado, supra note 119, at 561 n.15.
164. Gates, supra note 155, at 29 ("The distasteful truth will out: like it or not,
all writers are 'cultural impersonators.'").
165. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL ix (1992).
166. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW
PROFESSOR 6-7 (1991).
167. RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? xviii (1996).
168. See Abrams, supra note 148, at 1021 ("In agony narratives the author
reveals a painful experience - often one whose exposure is interdicted by social
taboos - in order to challenge the unapprehended harm inflicted by a practice or
rule.").
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be compelled to write a counter-story, 169 which if done by an In-
sider, would be suspect. 170 The totality of the Outsider storytelling
vision, and their style of implementation, does not concur with Pos-
ner's narrow script of the Public Intellectual as rhetorician pa-
tiently using the written word to gather an audience. Instead,
Bell, Williams, and Delgado, have retooled Public Intellectual tech-
niques to change the course of legal scholarship. Their individual
tactics vary, but each has had pervasive impact on the entrenched
status quo of doctrinalism.
Everything Bell does is designed to agitate the Authoritarians;
"making it difficult for them to respond and adjudge what is ac-
ceptable."17 ' He connects the implications of his parables to his
audience through confrontation; the fictional memo allegory to
President Bok became a "real" story,172 he resigned as dean of Ore-
gon Law School over the faculty's failure to hire an Asian,173 par-
ticipated in various sit-ins at Harvard, finally going into an exile
without pay over the law school's failure to hire female faculty. 174
The net effect was the creation of a form of legal storytelling Per-
formance Art in which "fiction, personal experience, and the stories
of people on the bottom illustrates how race and racism continue to
dominate our society."175
169. "How can you respond critically? Tell a different story of your own?" David
Sexton, Radio Review; Should We Be Blind or Not, Prof?, LONDON DAILY TELE-
GRAPH, Mar. 2, 1997, at 31.
170. See Delgado, supra note 119, at 561 n.15. Johnson sees another problem:
Indeed, I contend that white males do not employ the narrative, story-
telling style because to do so would result in their talking about their
dominance and that currently is not socially acceptable discourse. Also, to
emphasize their dominance and dominant position would demonstrate the
fact that the meritocracy they believe in is not really a true meritocracy,
but rather a system providing them with built-in advantages.
Johnson, supra note 117, at 2047 n.170.
171. BELL, supra note 165, at 143.
172. Id. at 125.
173. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Who's Afraid of Derrick Bell? A Conversation
on Harvard, Storytelling and the Meaning of Color, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 56.
174. When Bell exceeded the two-year absence limitation by not returning in
protest of what he called a poor minority record, Harvard terminated his contract.
See Fox Butterfield, Professor Steps up Fight with Harvard, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
1992, at A12; Ken Emerson, When Legal Titans Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1990,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 26 (describing the deceiving appearance of civility at Harvard
Law School); Mary Jordan, Black Harvard Law Professor Files Discrimination
Complaint Against School, WASH. POST. Mar. 3, 1992, at A15.
175. BELL, supra note 165, at 144.
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Patricia Williams is the perfect balance to Bell's allegorical ac-
tivism. She is metaphysical while he bludgeons with fire and
brimstone sermons. She specializes in introspection, he prefers
crisis. Above all, Williams is a storyteller qua storyteller, a master
of apocalyptic metaphor, a New Yorker magazine contributor, 176
and the author of the cultish The Alchemy of Race and Rights,
which Gates praises for "crisscross [ing] so many boundaries that
you forget where they used to be."177 Of her narrative ability, Pro-
fessor Culp says: "Professor Williams requires us to see the world
through her eyes; her words will not permit us the freedom to ig-
nore her reality."178
The Williams career story does not follow the path of the stere-
otypical academic who establishes status within a discipline by
specialized publication before moving on to dabble in a second, less
demanding, career.179 Williams is close to Posner's "independent"
Public Intellectual, an intellectual without an academic affiliation
who seeks to influence a general audience.'8 0 On the "academic"
side of her publication ledger is a single Harvard Law Review arti-
cle discussing a Supreme Court decision involving diversity pro-
gramming in broadcasting.' 8 ' On the other side of the ledger are
her law review narratives, op-ed pieces, plus three books' 8 2 - all
176. See Patricia J. Williams, My Best White Friend, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 26
& Mar. 4, 1996, at 94.
177. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Contract Killer, THE NATION, June 10, 1991, at 766
(reviewing PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)).
178. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and
Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539, 545 (1991).
For a negative view, see Jean Bethke Elshtain, Alchemy and the Law: Why this
Marriage Can't be Saved, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1171 (1992).
179. See Delgado, supra note 119, at 561.
180. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 27 ("You wrote for some more gen-
eral, less expert audience than an audience of academic specialists .... ").
181. Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC; Regrouping in a
Singular Time, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1990). Her style is uniquely Williams:
What is also troubling about this tendency is precisely the tendency to
universalize individualism. In eliding singular and plural to create an ab-
stract Uber-market-mensch, we diminish the notion of collectivity as a col-
lection of various overlapping others in favor of a collective self-again, a
plural singularity-that is both condensed yet general, multiple yet mono-
lithic, self-contained yet presumed representative.
Id. at 531.
182. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW
PROFESSOR (1991); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG (1995); PATRICIA J.
WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR BLIND FUTURE: THE PARADOX OF RACE (1999).
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written in Orwellian tradition; "What he had mattered more from
the standpoint of writing for the general public about politics; the
ability to see what was before his eyes and to describe what he saw
in unforgettably vivid prose. 183 As a narrativist, Williams seized
the supportive terrain of the Law Academy to conduct a Public In-
tellectual campaign to proselytize her tradecraft. The Authenticist
tradecraft transcends law, sociology, feminist studies, and the hu-
manities, among others.
Richard Delgado worked his way into the Public Intellectual
market by following his own advice; he published bread and butter
doctrinal articles, taught core courses, received tenure and then,
went on with his career.18 4 What separates Delgado's career from
that of Bell and Williams is the degree of academic "affiliation."
While the latter two opted to exploit a wide non-Law Academy au-
dience, Delgado maintained a close affiliation with law and is, as a
scholar and widely circulating visiting scholar, the most influential
"in-house" Outsider.185 It was his prowess as a narrativist that
gave storytelling its identity in the law journals.18 6 From 1992 to
1999 he peppered the academy with sixteen Rodrigo Chronicles -
narrative exchanges between the young and cynical yet perceptive
Rodrigo, and his Bell-like mentor - all appearing in the elite jour-
nals.'8 7 Rodrigo indoctrinated the student editors with the insou-
183. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 73.
184. See id. at 35.
185. I confess a bias. Delgado and his wife, Jean Stefanic, served as general
editors for CRITICAL AMERICA, a series of books on "the intersections of race, polit-
ics, sexual identity, and cultural studies ... founded in critical thought and theory"
published by N.Y.U. Press. See Press Release, New York University Press, An-
nouncing a New Series . . . CRITICAL AMERICA (1995) (on file with author). He
invited me as a conservative critic to participate, which I did (see supra note 38). It
was a rewarding experience.
186. Delgado is a relentlessly prolific scholar; during the years 1988-92 he was
the most productive author in the ten and twenty most cited law reviews. James
Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, The Most Prolific Law Professors and Faculties, 71 CHI.
KENT L. REV. 781, 807 (1996).
187. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357 (1992) (book re-
view); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of
Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1183 (1993); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle:
Care, Competition, and the Redemptive Strategy of Race, 81 CAL. L. REV. 387
(1993) (book review); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and
Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1993) (book review);
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifth Chronicle: Civitas, Civil Wrongs, and the Politics
of Denial, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1581 (1993); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chroni-
cle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
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ciant pithyism that was part of the new Postmodernism. Hence, in
a post-colonial snit, he blames the European civilization for devel-
oping linear thinking, which permitted the rascals to conquer, en-
slave, and exterminate, any culture that stood in the way.'8 8 In
his most perceptive tirade he went after the Saxons who "devel-
oped the hundred-page linear, densely footnoted, impeccably
crafted article - saying, in most cases, very little."18 9
VI. THE NEW PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL PARADIGM
A. Fred Rodell Returns: To a More Congenial Milieu?
This business of drawing historical analogies, whether by
way of explaining the past or predicting the future, is always
rather an exercise in rhetoric than a real search for truth;
human affairs can never be conveniently reduced to simple
formulae although there are folk who find intellectual com-
fort in trying to do so. 190
Given his sensitivity to the subject, Rodell would first dwell on
the frequency of citation to his Goodbye to Law Reviews' 91 and
puzzle over the cult mystique associated with his admonition that
there are only two things wrong with legal writing - style and con-
tent. 192 The next reference to pique his interest would be the sheer
639 (1993); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Seventh Chronicle: Race, Democracy, and
the State, 41 UCLA L. REV. 721 (1994); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chroni-
cle: Black Crime, White Fears - On the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L.
REV. 503 (1994); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Ninth Chronicle: Race, Legal Instru-
mentalism, and the Rule of Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1994); Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711 (1995);
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84
CAL. L. REV. 61 (1996); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Twelfth Chronicle: The Problem
of the Shanty, 85 GEO. L.J. 667 (1997); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Thirteenth
Chronicle: Legal Formalism and the Law's Discontents, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1105
(1997); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourteenth Chronicle: American Apocalypse, 32
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 275 (1997); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chroni-
cle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75
TEX. L. REV. 1181 (1997) (book review); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Final Chroni-
cle: Cultural Power, The Law Reviews, and the Attack on Narrative Jurisprudence,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 545 (1995).
188. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357, 1369 (1992).
189. Id. at 1373.
190. Fred Rodell, Is America Going Fascist? A Symposium on John T. Flynn's
Thesis, NEW LEADER, Mar. 25, 1944, at 2.
191. See Rodell, supra note 39; Packert, supra note 40.
192. Rodell, supra note 39, at 38.
274 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:243
number of diatribic articles either restating his criticisms' 93 - usu-
ally in "spinach" prose 194 - or declinist pieces raising hell about the
lack of connection between author and the profession.195 Too much
theory, too much indeterminacy they said, while Rodell's old school
(Yale) contributes to the mess by publishing popular legal culture
commentary, because it's "fun."198 The "simple formulae" from the
critics is the total lack of a unifying theme. "After nearly a decade
of sitting through faculty meetings and listening to my colleagues
discussing scholarship," Stephen Carter admitted, "I am quite cer-
tain that there is no such animal as the 'majoritarian' perspec-
tive . . ."97 Ever the realist, Rodell would have to acknowledge
that his reputation as an Outsider was based on a straw man: the
presence of the doctrinal article as the exclusive scholarship para-
digm was/is a figment of the Law Academy's collective imagina-
tion. In the real world, the market is composed of a smorgasbord of
autobiography, trashing,19 "self' indulgence writing, literary the-
ory, and a smattering of doctrinalism. 199 To the extent that Rodell
sought diversity, he was vindicated. Professor Deborah Rhode de-
scribes the prevailing scholarship landscape: "I believe that the
current diversity of approaches is a healthy development, that re-
cent theoretical, interdisciplinary, and 'outsider' perspective enrich
193. See, e.g., W. Lawrence Church, A Plea for Readable Law Review Articles,
1989 Wis. L. REV. 739 (1989); Commentary, Of Correspondence and Commentary,
24 CONN. L. REV. 157 (1991); Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Future of Legal Scholar-
ship and the Search for a Modern Theory of Law, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1986);
George D. Gopen, The State of Legal Writing; Res Ipsa Loquitur, 86 MICH. L. REV.
333 (1987); David L. Gregory, The Assault on Scholarship, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV.
993 (1991); Philip C. Kissam, The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L.
REV. 221 (1988); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok; Excesses in the Pursuit of
Truth and Tenure, 103 HARv. L. REV. 926 (1990).
194. See Rodell, supra note 39; Packert, supra note 40.
195. See Edwards, supra note 90.
196. Stewart Macaulay, Popular Legal Culture: An Introduction, 98 YALE L.J.
1545, 1558 (1989).
197. Carter, supra note 133, at 2075.
198. See Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984) ("Take spe-
cific arguments very seriously in their own terms; discover they are actually foolish
([tragi-comic); and then look for some (external observer's) order (not the germ of
truth) in the internally contradictory, incoherent chaos we've exposed.").
199. Posner calls the "new approaches" interdisciplinary: which "will come
eventually to dominate academic law." Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship To-
day, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1317 (2002) [hereinafter Legal Scholarship Today].
20031 THE LAW ACADEMY PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL 275
the study of legal issues, and that these perspectives are no more
ideologically driven than their predecessor."200
Would the prevalence of diversity of scholarship and "non-
traditional"20 1 standards have given Rodell different career oppor-
tunities? Unquestionably he would be called an "academostar"20 2
in today's market, who, with his charisma, would be a lock to excel
on the TV talk show circuit. The TV-charisma factor is, however, a
problem, feeding Posner's contempt for the arrogance of the aca-
demic Public Intellectual as spoiled brat. As every productive and
imaginative professor who wanders off the reservation to write an
op-ed piece or gets a media byte knows, what follows is the inevita-
ble grumbling about "wasting time on twaddle" by playing the ce-
lebrity game while ignoring classes. Moreover, all Public
Intellectuals are tainted by "publicity intellectuals" who use ethi-
cally problematical tactics to get media attention.203 The most fre-
quent put downs are: "he does journalism," "a mere popularizer,"
or, worst of all, "a celebrity intellectual."20 4 As Rodell learned, ca-
reers are made or broken depending on the distinction between se-
rious peer reviewed work and "twaddle."205
200. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1329
(2002).
201. Association of American Law Schools, Report of the AALS Special Commit-
tee on Tenure and the Tenuring Process, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 477 (1992) [hereinafter
AALS Report on Tenure].
202. Janny Scott, Scholars Fear 'Star' System May Undercut Their Mission,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1997, at Al; also described as "a poster professor." Id. at B9.
203. Carlin Romano, The Dirty Little Secret About Publicity Intellectuals,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 19, 1999, at B5.
204. Another nasty poke: "Most public intellectuals function as quote-suppliers
to legitimize the media .... You know, if no journalist calls for a quote, then I'm
not a public intellectual; I just sit there writing my books and teaching classes."
Herbert Gans, The Future of the Public Intellectual, THE NATION, Feb. 12, 2001, at
25.
205. The distinction became public debate when the President of Harvard Uni-
versity objected to the "non-scholarly" activities of Cornel West, a well-known
Harvard professor and coveted Public Intellectual. The extracurricular activities
included political work for Bill Bradley and recording a spoken word compact disc.
"While the recording has often been described as rap, Dr. West said he preferred
the Nietzschean phrase 'danceable education.'" Pam Belluck & Jacques Steinberg,
Defector Indignant at Harvard, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 2002, at A24; see Sam
Tanenhaus, The Ivy League's Angry Star, VANITY FAIR, June, 2002, at 201.
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B. Postmodernism: A Life-Cycle Cultural Change
"But most importantly for would-be Messiahs not content with
the unmessianic, unheroic roles assigned to mere law professors in
American culture, pomo provided a perceived pathway to power: a
'method' for 'proving' whatever you liked with whatever you
had.2 o6
In condemning the academic Public Intellectual, Posner
sounds like his Jeremiah declinist who spits anger "from contrast-
ing an idealized past, its vices overlooked, with a demonized pres-
ence, its virtues overlooked."20 7 With "reckless abandon"20° he
accuses others of debasing academics with superficial popularizing
and in his frustration loses the opportunity to display a more
thoughtful economic analysis of changing conditions in the legal
scholarship market. According to management economics, prod-
ucts go through a life-cycle: introduction, growth, maturity, and de-
cline. 20 9 During any cycle a range of variables determines success
or failure: innovation, style changes creating or altering demand,
"superior still, foresight and industry"210 of management, amongst
others. Legal scholarship fits this life cycle analysis.
Culture is in a perpetual state of life cycle permutation - a
persistent process of creative destruction that revolutionizes, es-
sentially destroying the old culture, creating a new one.21 ' I sus-
pect that Posner avoided an examination of the cultural life cycle
because it involves the creative destruction of structural thought -
the culture of objectivity, truth, certainty, and system;21 2 a culture
that he admires. The replacement is a new life cycle of
206. Dennis W. Arrow, Spaceball (Or, Not Everything That's Left is
Postmodern), 54 VAND. L. REV. 2381, 2385 (2001).
207. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 282.
208. Id. at 374.
209. THOMAS T. NAGLE & REED K. HOLDEN, THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF
PRICING 177 (3d ed. 2002) ("A market evolves despite changes in brands and styles.
A product concept is born, gradually gains in buyer acceptance, eventually attains
full buyer acceptance, and is ultimately discarded for something better. The mar-
ket defined by that product concept evolves correspondingly through four phases:
development, growth, maturity, and decline .... In each of its phases, the market
has a unique personality.").
210. This can rationalize monopolization. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
211. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPTER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83
(Harper Torch Books 1962).
212. See STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY: CRITICAL IN-
TERROGATIONS 20 (1991).
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Postmodernism, a culture that is, by definition definitionless; it
"offers man everything or nothing,"213 a world in which "reality is
unordered and ultimately unknowable."214 The Postmodern Public
Intellectual is quite different from the Posner version - and more
compatible with Rodell's vision.
Politics and culture coalesced in the 1970s to produce
Postmodernism. For the university community it meant the rejec-
tion of hierarchy, authority, and the voice of the author.2 15 Steven
Conner traces the paradigm shift to the publication of Jean-Fran-
cois Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition, an attack on the legiti-
macy of science, where he argued that it is a cover for "a multitude
of different, incompatible language-games, each with its own un-
transferable principles of self-legitimation."216 Instead of the guid-
ing vision of meta-narrative principles, the Postmodern condition
is dominated by micro-narratives, which "flourish alongside each
other... [without] a conversation or consensus between them."217
"[Wie are enjoined to 'gaze in wonderment' at this linguistic diver-
sity and to cheer the language-games on in their cellular splitting
and reduplication." 218 By the 1990s heterogeneity of discourse, the
rejection of walls and privilege separating disciplines, and indeter-
minacy, defined the academy's zeitgeist.219
It was no accident that the Public Intellectual revival occurred
in conjunction with Postmodernism. An increasing demand for
public commentary to cut through the new jargon triggered a surge
in supply from an ambitious and rebellious crowd eager to replace
the canon elders as spokesmen. Much of the vigor came from a
festering discontent in recent decades at the inversion and special-
ization of academic life.220 A deluge of works rationalizing the life-
cycle crisis, followed by a prescription of new paradigms, each one
213. Id. at 7.
214. Id. at 9.
215. See STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERN CULTURE 7 (1989).
216. Id. at 32.
217. Id. at 34.
218. Id.
219. For the Devil's Dictionary of Postmodernism, see Dennis W. Arrow,
Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" For the Uniniti-
ated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997).
220. See Janny Scott, Thinking Out Loud: The Public Intellectual Is Reborn,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1994, at B1; see also Boynton, supra note 113 (discussing the
resurgence of Public Intellectuals).
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creating a trail of commentary as a "series of arguments"221
Postmodern art, music, literature, or whatever, produced a new
wave of Public Intellectual performers.
The market disruptions produced by the Postmodern para-
digm in legal education drastically altered the role of the law aca-
demic Public Intellectual. In confirming the fait accompli of the
new paradigm's role in legal education, 222 the Cardozo Law Re-
view's Symposium 22 3 on deconstruction signaled the emergence of
a new role for Public Intellectualism. Jacques Derrida's lead-in ar-
ticle provided the centerpiece with his characteristic free play;
musing after forty-four pages of coherent incoherence he acknowl-
edged: "I have not yet begun. Perhaps I'll never begin.., except
that I've already begun."224 The follow-up testimony from the sup-
port articles demonstrated the total erosion of structure, system,
and walls in legal discourse. 225 Law professors wrestled with the
literary insights of deconstruction; a religion professor discussed
the "law of desire"226 while philosophers, political scientists, and
English Literature academics tried to emulate Derrida's "differ-
ence."227 More significant was the participation of a cluster of aca-
221. Edward Rothstein, Moral Relativity Is a Hot Topic? True. Absolutely.,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2002, at B7 (quoting Stanley Fish, Dean, College of Liberal
Arts and Sciences, U. Ill. Chicago).
222. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERN.
ISM T POSTMODERNISM (2000).
223. Symposium, Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 919 (1990).
224. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundations of Authority,"
11 CARDozo L. REV. 921, 945 (1990). Derrida's obscure syntax invites "freeplay;"
see WILLIAM E. CAIN, THE CRISIS IN CRITICISM: THEORY, LITERATURE, AND REFORM
IN ENGLISH STUDIES 167 (1984) ("[Flor readers with a lifetime to spare, there is
also a 100-page essay by Jacques Derrida, dealing with a subject yet to be
determined.").
225. Alan Hunt, The Big Fear, 35 McGILL L.J. 508, 519 (1990) ("In its most
general form postmodernism is anti-foundational in the sense that it denies the
possibility of philosophy providing any epistemological guarantees for legal dis-
course, in particular, by undermining claims to tests of legal validity, rules of in-
terpretation and the general positivistic quest for certainty, and if not certainty,
then predictability.").
226. Mark C. Taylor, Desire of Law-Law of Desire, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1269
(1990).
227. HENRY SUSSMAN, HIGH RESOLUTION: CRITICAL THEORY AND THE PROBLEM
OF LITERACY 46 (1989) (Difference is "a marginal zone where the particular, the
unique, and the incommensurate may reside in autonomy from the broader sys-
tems that threaten to assimilate, absorb, or reduce them.").
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demic Public Intellectuals 228 whose contributions to a law review
symposium raises a question unique to the Postmodern Law Acad-
emy: at what point, if ever, does Public Intellectualizing cross over
into the academic sphere? In other words, has the gap between
Public Intellectual "puff" and "serious" scholarship narrowed - or
disappeared? Regardless, what is the effect of law Public Intellec-
tual work on tenure and status?
C. Public Intellectual, Postmodernism, and Tenure
Is tenure a rite of passage or a scam? Take your pick, but the
bottom line is that tenure is a lifetime entitlement to privilege and
supra-competitive wages. All it takes is the publication of two or
three articles in non-peer, student-edited, law journals.229 It is a
sub-paradigm that will challenge Outsider efforts to gain enough
support for the acceptance of nontraditional scholarship - includ-
ing Public Intellectual work - from the Law Academy commu-
nity.230 A new perspective depends on people who are willing to
make an effort to "develop it to the point where hardheaded argu-
ments can be produced and multiplied" to justify recognition of a
new paradigm. 231
The status quo makes sense: law schools derive significant
economies in getting a committed performance during the proba-
tionary tenure period at low wages. Whatever the tenure decision,
the school will get the benefit of some publication exposure. More-
over, for a modest stipend, management obtains a thorough peer
review of the candidate's scholarship from an outside panel of ex-
perts - it is the only formal institutional peer review a law profes-
228. Judith Butler, Jonathan Culler, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Barbara Herrn-
stein Smith, and Alan Wolfe.
229. It was not until 1969 that Harvard Law School required even a single arti-
cle for promotion. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL-THE INFLUENCE OF
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 126 (1978).
230. Stanley Fish argues that interpretation is, after all, restrained by the exis-
tence of "interpretive communities." STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?
171 (1980). These "communities" are groups composed "of those who share inter-
pretive strategies not for reading (in the conventional sense) but for writing texts,
for constituting their properties and assigning their intentions." Id. at 171.
231. 2 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 158 (Otto
Neurath et al. eds., University of Chicago Press 2d ed. 1970) (1962). Moreover,
"the new paradigm must promise to preserve a relatively large part of the concrete
problem-solving ability that has accrued to science through its predecessors." Id. at
169.
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sor ever experiences. Another economic benefit is that the
doctrinal paradigm propagates product differentiations. 232 Law
schools advertise the Tyranny of Objectivity - the casebook
method, the analytical paradigm - to nurture a reputation for pro-
ducing objective scholarship, thereby differentiating its mission
from the mush coming from the humanities. 233 Like engineers and
economists, law professors justify supra-competitive salaries on
the basis of scholarship that relies on rational analysis to solve
problems.234
Outsiders argue that the tenure system's rejection of story-
telling as the legitimate voice of the minority perspective, on its
face, rationalizes recognition of a flexible inclusive tenure para-
digm. They argue that without this acknowledgement the Law
Academy cannot claim to represent its constituency. 235 Under Pro-
fessor Kuhn's notion of scientific paradigm change, this would con-
stitute a "crisis" in which the existing system is incapable of coping
with a new anomaly, for example, the presence of Outsider scholar-
ship, justifying reliance on an alternate paradigm. 23 6 Outsiders
232. JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS To NEw COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CON-
SEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 114 (1956) ("Product differentiation is
propagated... by efforts of sellers to distinguish their products through packag-
ing, branding... and sales-promotional efforts designed to win the allegiance...
of the potential buyer."). For a discussion of Public Intellectualism as a form of
product differentiation, see infra note 253.
233. "In a way I'm looking forward to Socratic instruction. I've heard so much
about it since I applied to law school - it will at least be interesting to see what it's
like." SCOTT TUROW, ONE L 24 (Warner Book ed., 1977).
234. Arthur Austin, Law Professor Salaries: The Deobjectification of Legal
Scholarship by Tenured Radicals, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 243 (1999).
235. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Scholarly Paradigm: A New Tradition Based on
Context and Color, 16 VT. L. REv. 913, 921 (1992) ("On the other hand, when the
scholar of color speaks to any racial issue, such as affirmative action, one can pre-
dict that she may see and evaluate that issue differently than her majoritarian
colleagues. Her viewpoint will be greatly informed as a result of her different ex-
periences in our society as a person of color. The neutral, consensus-driven para-
digm for evaluating such scholarship is too narrowly circumscribed to evaluate the
merit and worth of the work of scholars of color when speaking in the voice of color.
A new paradigm must be employed--one that recognizes the existence and the
worth of the voice of color. This new paradigm must not supplant, but must sup-
plement the majoritarian paradigm.").
236. The shift begins when existing rules cannot solve new "puzzles."
"[Rlecognized anomalies whose characteristic feature is their stubborn refusal to
be assimilated to existing paradigms." KUHN, supra note 231, at 97. The next step
is a "revolution" in which an alternate paradigm competes with existing paradigms
for support within the community. "Conversions will occur a few at a time until,
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have the support of the Association of American Law Schools, the
Law Academy's trade association, which provided ideological sup-
port by recommending that member schools avoid "prejudice
against any particular methodology or perspective used in teaching
a scholarship." 237
From a Posnerian perspective the Outsiders seek to disrupt an
efficiently-run market system that uses objective criteria to pro-
duce the best products; Outsider Postmodernists view the doctrinal
barrier as a replay of The Hunger Artist scenario of a morally cor-
.rupt individualist survival of the fittest.238 The reality is some-
where in the middle, in the existence of a common ground - self
interest - that compels a compromise. The relatively short deci-
sion time of five to six years for tenure is the key. Even with law
review experience - a modest learning experience at best - young
professors are not prepared for the mysteries of 'The Abyss of Le-
gal Scholarship."239 Nevertheless, the analytical style of the doc-
trinal article lends itself to a quick study, and in a flush market in
which each law school publishes at least three journals, a professor
can jot something down on a napkin and it gets published.240 In
addition, there is normally no empirical component. Evaluation
criteria, while dicey, follow a conventional discourse totally lacking
in storytelling, 241 which defies analytical assessment 242 and meth-
after the last holdouts have died, the whole profession will again be practicing
under a single, but now a different, paradigm." Id. at 152.
237. AALS Report on Tenure, supra note 201, at 505 ("When evaluating any
work embodying innovative or less widely pursued methodologies or perspectives,
the standard should be neither higher nor lower than the standard used for evalu-
ating more traditional work.").
238. See West, supra note 68, and accompanying text.
239. AUSTIN, supra note 38, at 156-60.
240. Rothfeld, supra note 80, and accompanying text.
241. On quality control, Posner says:
Doctrinal scholarship may have been (may be) dull and limited, but it is
useful and it is conducted under conditions that ensure minimum quality.
Those conditions - a large professional audience; a common academic cul-
ture; continuity with teaching, judging, and performance as a student;
and law review editing - are missing from interdisciplinary legal scholar-
ship; and the fact that its audience is almost entirely academic raises the
issue of utility in acute form.
Legal Scholarship Today, supra note 199, at 1324.
242. Farber & Sherry, supra note 154, at 854 ("Unlike some advocates of story-
telling, however, we see no reason to retreat from conventional standards of truth-
fulness and typicality in assessing stories. Nor do we see any reason to abandon
the expectation that legal scholarship contain reason and analysis, as well as nar-
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odological content.243 The reality is that most candidates will fol-
low the Delgado advice: play the doctrinal game, get a union card,
and write stories.244 It is a temporary compromise. Outsiders are
placated with the knowledge that any sacrifice is worth the tran-
sient inconvenience. They are the beneficiaries of the objectifica-
tion factor, which assures premium wages245 and ultimately they
will reap what they believe will be the benefits of the surging
Postmodern culture. Nevertheless, as Postmodernism increases
its influence, so does the ubiquity of non-traditional writing.
There are anecdotal stories suggesting that schools with a vi-
brant Postmodern agenda tolerate a flexible interactive tenure
package that includes nontraditional work. Typically the non-
traditional contribution is from the storytelling genre. It can be a
risky move for a candidate since it means changing from the
straightforward doctrinal linear style to a reconstruction of the au-
thor's consciousness of experience - all under the pressure of a
short time frame. Moreover, even if the faculty approves tenure,
the package must still pass muster with the university administra-
tion that expect traditional scholarship and would likely be puz-
zled over the peer evaluation of narratives. 246 "[P]erspectives
come and go, but scholarship must forever look like
scholarship."247
The tricky question is what weight, if any, to give Public Intel-
lectual work - including narrative - performed during the proba-
tionary tenure period. Should op-eds, media bytes, and TV
appearances, get positive references in the tenure decision discus-
sion and the recommendation? As a practical matter, it is difficult
rative. A legal story without analysis is much like a judicial opinion with 'Findings
of Fact' but no 'Conclusions of Law.'").
243. See Rubin, supra note 153, at 955-56.
244. Delgado, supra note 119, at 561.
245. See Austin, supra note 234 and accompanying text.
246. AALS Report on Tenure, supra note 201 ("A growing number of universi-
ties around the country have restricted the power of law faculty governance in
matters of tenure on the basis of a fear of laxity of standards, particularly with
regard to scholarly accomplishment. As this University enters a new era, the Law
School must maintain its tradition of responsibility and excellence if it is to justifi-
ably retain the confidence of the University's administration."); see also Ken My-
ers, Decisions on Personnel at Pitt Prompt Staff and Student Protest, NAT'L L.J.,
June 7, 1993, at 4 (discussing refusal of provost to grant tenure to faculty member
despite approval of full faculty).
247. Michael Pacanowsky, Slouching Towards Chicago, 74 Q.J. OF SPEECH 453,
456 (1988) (relating a story about storytelling as scholarship).
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for a beginner to establish a public presence. But in today's mass
media world where everyone gets their fifteen minutes of notori-
ety, it does occur. Jonathan Turley, number 38 on "Posner's
list,"248 started a successful Public Intellectual career as a law
clerk, parlaying a law review article into a local TV interview
about how "televangelists like Jimmy Swaggart could be prose-
cuted under the RICO statute."249 Perhaps Turley is the wave of
the future, but the conventional reaction to pre-tenure Public In-
tellectual work is antagonistic - it is considered selfish and imma-
ture, especially by jealous non-producing colleagues, to divert time
from research on tenure projects.
D. Economics Redeems Rodell's Career
As a sinecure, tenure creates multiple options: sloth, research,
Public Intellectualism, or a combination of all three. Reflecting the
"academization of intellectual life," 250 Public Intellectualism has
become an attractive option: it garners celebrity, modest remuner-
ation and the "illusion of power,"251 while serving to compensate
for sloth. Microeconomic analysis reveals that these factors are
merely part of a cluster of variables that define Public Intellectual-
ism as an autonomous economic universe.
Like the doctrinal paradigm, 252 the academic Public Intellec-
tual is the beneficiary of barriers to entry, a condition that affects
the entry of new sellers into the Public Intellectual market. 253 The
higher the barrier, the greater is the market power (over status
and pricing) of established sellers. The most obvious barrier to the
academic Public Intellectual market is the price of admission, or
what is known as absolute cost advantages. The absolute cost bar-
248. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 209.
249. Jason Zengerle, Turley's Gig, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 7, 1998, at 18.
250. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 29 n.26.
251. Id. at 66.
252. See BAIN, supra note 232 and accompanying text.
253. BAIN, supra note 232, at 4 ("As suggested above, the condition of entry is a
structural concept. Like some other aspects of market structure, it may be viewed
as potentially subject to quantitative evaluation in terms of a continuous variable.
This variable is the percentage by which established firms can raise price above a
specified competitive level without attracting new entry-a percentage which may
vary continuously from zero to a very high figure, with entry becoming 'more diffi-
cult' by small gradations as it does so. As the difficulty of entry (thus understood
and evaluated) increases, some systematic variations in the behavior of estab-
lished firms may be anticipated.").
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riers are high: time and cost invested in a graduate degree, tenure
costs, and the opportunity costs involved in publication, for in-
stance, benefits lost from consulting, amongst others.254 Law
Academies benefit from a public regulation barrier; as lawyers
they must pass the licensing requirement. Finally, independent
Public Intellectuals do not have access to the academic's financial
and time tenure subsidies.255
The distinction between academic and independent Public In-
tellectuals can be analyzed as an expression of product differentia-
tion. Anything that distinguishes a product, brand, or group of
items, from substitutable rivals by creating consumer allegiances,
provides a seller with an edge over rivals.256 As Posner acknowl-
edges, the academic imprimatur gives the academic Public Intel-
lectual a clear edge over the independents in credibility and
frequency of use.2 5 7 To the economic advantage of the law aca-
demic Public Intellectual, product differentiation can have dual ef-
fects: inter-industry - academics versus independent non-affiliated
intellectuals, and intra-industry - law academies versus other dis-
ciplines. 258 Posner identifies the supra-differentiating characteris-
tics of law vis-&-vis other fields (industries) as "the growing
importance of law in American society and the growing inter-dis-
ciplinarity of academic lawyers .... 25 9 Diverted to counting me-
dia cites, Posner passes over the opportunity for a fertile and
provocative discussion of how law perpetuates its high barriers to
entry by sustaining an endless supply of advertising deriva-
254. SAMUELSON, supra note 35, at 443 ("[Slome of the most important costs
attributable to doing one thing rather than another stem from the foregone oppor-
tunities that have to be sacrificed in doing this one thing.").
255. This is tantamount to: "established firms may be able to secure the use of
factors of production, including investible funds, at lower prices than potential en-
trants can ... ." BAIN, supra note 232, at 14.
256. Id. at 114.
257. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 34, 50.
258. BAIN, supra note 232, at 121-22 ("Product differentiation, as we have indi-
cated, may have a dual effect: first, on the character of intra-industry competition
among established firms, and second, on the condition of entry. The effect of intra-
industry competition will take the form of supporting preferred market shares
based on regular customer allegiances to certain sellers, of encouraging advertis-
ing and other sales promotion as competitive weapons, of permitting some sellers
to obtain higher prices or lower unit selling costs than others, and so forth.").
259. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 173.
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tives:260 "Jerry Springer" type trials such as those involving 0. J.
Simpson, Bernhard Goetz, Heidi Fleiss, the Menendez brothers, 261
and issues such as the Clinton impeachment, 262 obscenity, terror-
ist detention, 263 along with a constant chorus of front page Consti-
tutional controversy. 264
Intra-industry product differentiation internalizes competition
among law schools for student recruitment and curriculum design.
Although officially disdained,265 every law school plays the rank-
ings game, fighting for market position in the Top 50, 25, or the
"elite 10."266 Consumer-conscious admissions people know that
the vocational appeal of The Paper Chase and L.A. Law have been
replaced by the Ally McBealism2 6 7 of the Postmodern generation -
a culture of entitlement, assured self-esteem, and good grades. 268
The key factor is recognition of the Napster generation's computer
consciousness and their addiction to information dissemination. 269
The text has been replaced by the Internet.
260. Which unlike most advertising, is cost free. See BAIN, supra note 232, at
115.
261. See Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, The New
Media, and Deviancy, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 51 (1995).
262. Posner's summary: "The emotionality of the public intellectual, so well il-
lustrated by the perverfid [sic] reactions of public intellectuals to the Clinton im-
peachment and the 2000 presidential election deadlock, stands in particularly
striking contrast to the official image of the academic." PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS,
supra note 2, at 127.
263. See Adam Liptak, Neil A. Lewis & Benjamin Weiser, After Sept. 11, A Le-
gal Battle on the Limits of Civil Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at Al.
264. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 107-21.
265. See Press Release, Association of American Law Schools, Association of
American Law Schools Calls on U.S. News & World Report to Stop Ranking Law
Schools; Study Challenges Validity of Magazine's System, (Feb. 18, 1998), availa-
ble at http://www.aals.org/ranknews.html (on file with author); Cynthia Cotts,
Deans and Watchdogs Flunk U.S. News Law School Rankings, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 2,
1998, at A13; Roger Parloff, Who's Number One? And Who's Number 52, 91, and
137? Am. LAw. Apr. 1998, at 5.
266. See Arthur Austin, The Postmodern Buzz in Law School Rankings, 27 VT.
L. REV. 49 (2003).
267. Who is "constantly disappointed by life's failure to satisfy her expectations
of boundless love and unqualified success." Terrence Rafferty, That Girl, G.Q. Feb.
1998, at 61, 64. David Kelley, who wrote and produced Ally McBeal, was also a
writer on the L.A. Law series. See id.
268. See Harvey Mansfield, To B or Not to B? WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2001, at
A16; Anemona Hartocollis, Harvard Faculty Votes to Put the Excellence Back in the
A, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at A20.
269. The Napster characterization comes from A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 909-10 (N.D. Cal. 2000). "The matter before the court
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To convey a Postmodern voice, law schools have created a web-
site universe to attract students. The interactive conversation is
intended to assure the Napsters that the schools' curriculum repli-
cates their undergraduate Club Med retirement-village-for-the-
young 270 experience, and that entitlement to good grades, a "silent
classroom," 271 and indeterminacy, will continue in a new pack-
age.272 A problem immediately surfaced as a result of the "gotta
keep an eye on those rankings"273 syndrome, leading rivals to rep-
licate each others tactics - a classic product differentiation stand-
off - and possibly a social cost.2 74 The solution: adopt the
undergraduate tactic of the "Professor as Celebrity;"275 compete in
personality differentiation.
The law schools have literally shifted the contest from the ce-
lebrity as determined by a small group of peer scholars (the "seri-
ous" scholar celebrity) to the celebrity as determined by the public
media uis-ez-vis the student audience (the Public Intellectual celeb-
rity). The strategy: encourage the faculty to produce a pastiche of
op-eds, TV appearances, and magazine commentary supported by
concerns the boundary between sharing and theft, personal use and the unautho-
rized worldwide distribution of copyrighted music and sound recordings." Id. at
900. On pirating, a commentator concluded:
Seeing themselves as more Robin Hood than Captain Hook, the loose con-
federation of students, university employees and software company insid-
ers was apparently motivated primarily by ideology - a belief that
products consisting purely of information are somehow different from
those you can hold in your hand. Like thoughts, they should be allowed to
run free.
George Johnson, Lost in Cyberspace: If You Can't Touch It, Can You Steal It?, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, at A5; John Schwartz, Trying to Keep Young Internet Users
From a Life of Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2001, at Cl.
270. Mark Edmundson, On the Uses of a Liberal Education, HARPER'S MAG.,
Sept. 1997, at 39, 43.
271. See Michiko Kakutani, Debate? Dissent? Discussion? Oh, Don't Go There!
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2002, at B7 (citing student-written article entitled Silent
Classroom).
272. And, according to an autobiography by a Harvard and a Stanford gradu-
ate, they have exceeded the Club Med lifestyle. See JAIME MARQUART & ROBERT
EBERT BYRNES, BRUSH WITH THE LAW (2001).
273. Rachel Toor, Princeton vs. Yale - Post-Frenzy Boredom in Admissions,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 16, 2002, at B5.
274. See H. Michael Mann, Advertising, Concentration, and Profitability in IN-
DUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 137, 152 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et
al. eds., 1974).
275. Scott, supra note 220, at Al ("It's very much a part of the late 20th cen-
tury, this celebrity-itis .... It is the academic aspect of the fascination with instant
gratification, competition and races for prestige and celebrity status.").
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slick up-scale alumni magazines. 27 6 So long as ranking dominates
student recruitment, admissions people assume that Public Intel-
lectual differentiation will exert an influence at the edges and
could have an effect on the voting in the reputation category of the
U. S. News & World Report annual college ranking.277 For many
of those who cast their votes - judges and lawyers 278 - an appear-
ance on The O'Reilly Factor trumps an article in the Harvard Law
Review. It is the Buzz game.2 79 It is a situation that breeds re-
spect from the administration because as Herbert Gans said, Pub-
lic Intellectuals get publicity and if they're getting publicity,
"they're getting prestige, and if they get prestige, that may help
them get students or grant money."280
VII. A REVISED MARKET THAT IS PUBLIC
INTELLECTUAL FRIENDLY
Microeconomic analysis identifies a distinct law academic
Public Intellectual market protected by high barriers to entry.
Website competition among schools rewards professors who engage
in public dialogue. Efficiency and self-interest encourage faculty to
maximize returns during the post-tenure period when they can
276. N.Y.U.'s magazine has been called "law porn" for its purported use as obvi-
ous sales promotion. See Brian Leiter, The Law School Observer, 3 GREEN BAG 2d
327 (2000); Terry Carter, Rankled by the Rankings, 84 A.B.A. J. 46 (1998).
277. A dangerous assumption. As John Wanamaker reputedly said: "I know
half the money I spend on advertising is wasted, but I can never find out which
half." Arthur Austin, Antitrust Proscription and the Mass Media, 1968 DuKE L.J.
1021, 1031-32 (1968) (quoting John Wanamaker).
278. Reputation is "[mleasured by two surveys .... The dean and three faculty
members at each school were asked to rate schools from 'marginal' (1) to 'distin-
guished' (5) .... Lawyers, hiring partners, and senior judges rated schools ...
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 9, 2001, at 79.
279. The Tulane strategy is typical:
From baseball to divorce to military tribunals, Tulane Law School faculty
were quoted in numerous national and regional media outlets this year,
including the NEW YORK TIMES, USA TODAY, FORBES, BOSTON HERALD, US
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, ESPN and National Public Radio. The increased
visibility is the result of a new emphasis by Dean Lawrence Ponoroff on
external relations as a means to help raise the image of Tulane Law
School. The dean hired a New Orleans public relations firm and tapped
Ann Salzer, assistant dean, to implement the aggressive new strategy.
Salzer works closely with Mary Mouton (L '90), president of Mouton Me-
dia, to assist law faculty in the area of media relations.
20 TUL. LAw. 6 (Summer 2002).
280. Gans, supra note 204, at 25.
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best exploit the law's extensive relevance to public issues. The net
effect of these dynamics is to scramble and revise the agenda of the
legal scholarship market.
In registering his disdain with the academic Public Intellec-
tual, Judge Posner ignored the connective issue of legal scholar-
ship and the demise of the doctrinal paradigm.281 Initiated by new
fashions - feminism, critical race ideology, and Posner's Law and
Economics and its influence - the Outsider movement rides the
coat tails of Postmodernism to generate substitutable products
that are breaking down the walls - the old entry barriers - that
formerly protected the "dominant" system. As the Association of
American Law Schools implores: no prejudice against "nontradi-
tional" scholarship is permitted. 28 2 But what is "nontraditional?"
A generous doctrinalist may accept the credibility of an article in
Harper's or Atlantic Monthly (unless it is by Stanley Fish)2 3 but
what about the New Republic or the National Review? Or what
about: "Professor Patricia Williams and noted saxophonist Oliver
Lake [appearing] in a performance piece titled 'Skin' and based on
the writings of Prof. Williams?"28 4
The micro-economist can posit another market quirk: the in-
clusion of the clinical component as a viable participant in the re-
vised scholarship market. As manifestly vocational, the clinic's
function is to showcase the academy's commitment to teaching the
practice qua practice of law28 5 - an imitation of medicine's on-the-
281. In an article, Posner equivocates on the ultimate demise of doctrinal writ-
ing but acknowledges the growing influence of non-traditional work. See Legal
Scholarship Today, supra note 199, at 1317.
282. See AALS Report on Tenure, supra note 201, at 505.
283. Stanley Fish, Postmodern Warfare: The Ignorance of Our Warrior Intellec-
tuals, HARPER'S MAG., July, 2002, at 33. Whence the origin of Fish's definition of
postmodernism as a "series of arguments." See supra note 221.
284. COLUM. L. ScH. REP., Faculty Briefs, Spring 2001, at 35. "'Here was this
jazzy music, played by a man in dreadlocks, and prim me', Williams said, beaming
at the context. 'We found that heartfelt social commentary around race is heard
better when you have a good saxophonist.'" Karen R. Long, A Genius at Pinpoint-
ing Racial Incongruities, CLEVE. PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 22, 2000, at 1L, 3L.
285. Columbia University President Lee Bollinger, former dean at Michigan
Law School, sums up the new paradigm: "They have moved from being trade
schools to being serious intellectual places. The 'clinical' side is still taught, but it's
a small piece of the educational experience. Medical schools, too, have undergone
a change from being places of mere apprenticeship to venues of unabashed schol-
arly inquiry." Tunku Varadarajan, A Matter of Degree: Which One Makes a Jour-
nalist?, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2002, at 15 (quoting Lee C. Bollinger, President,
Columbia University).
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job training. Introduced to balance the theoretical abstractism of
the casebook method, clinicians persevere as "dead souls" - carried
on the rolls of the living but without status. 28 6 As non-tenured
contract workers, they are stigmatized for teaching skills rather
than theory.
In exchange, however, clinicians do not have to publish. In-
deed, devoting time to writing law review articles would be deemed
wasteful diversion from teaching vocational skills. It is a relation-
ship involving tension on both sides - clinicians are frustrated over
a lack of security, while the administration chafes at the difficulty
of evaluating the performance of people teaching "how to do it."
Observation by faculty is time-consuming and student evaluations
are unreliable. Giving credit for Public Intellectual activity would
benefit both sides. The school can evaluate the analytical and pub-
lic presence of the instructor while adding to the "website pack-
age." Clinicians could earn status, and more importantly, gain
bargaining leverage for security.
As a practicing declinist Judge Posner harps on the vulgariza-
tion of Public Intellectualism. As "entertainers,"28 7 its contempo-
rary practitioners are disingenuous, produce "goulash," and are
given to confabulation. He especially deplores the increasing pres-
ence of unsavory academic-affiliated Public Intellectuals who use
the tenure subsidy to carelessly throw out off-the-wall predictions,
knowing that veracity is irrelevant in a market in which the public
protects itself against defective performance "by not taking it very
seriously."288 The primary cause of the problem is the demise of
the independent Public Intellectual who served a gatekeeper func-
tion, always poised to deflate academic hubris and pomposity. The
ultimate consequence, the target of the Posner Jeremiah, is a
breakdown in accountability: "nobody watching, nobody keeping
score."
289
286. See NicoLAI GOGOL, DEAD SOULS 1 (1857).
287. See Richard A. Posner, The University as Business, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
June 2002, at 21.
288. PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, supra note 2, at 388.
289. Id. at 390.
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Public criticism of Alan Dershowitz,290 Jonathan Turley,291
and Cornel West 292 for Public Intellectual excesses, Posner's own
book of furious critique, plus the scolding he, in return received
from critics, all suggest the inevitability of some degree of account-
ability. 293 But Posner's point is a valid one. There is no systematic
market gate-keeping mechanism and his suggested remedy, that
universities require faculty to post their "non-academic" publica-
tions on a website is too implausible to be taken seriously. 294
It is also true that "national" Public Intellectuals are in an ex-
clusive market with a high celebrity factor, which renders criticism
largely irrelevant. In fact, as the antics of Dershowitz demon-
strate, public rebuke assures repeat excesses, thereby hyping ce-
lebrity. The situation is quite different in the secondary market
where an increasingly large group of young ambitious law profes-
sors get "regional" attention on local TV and radio, write op-eds,
and every once in a while, make it to the "bigs" on the national
media. They are a valuable asset to their institutions as the insti-
tutions scramble to improve their rankings. On a school's website
the young Public Intellectuals become symbols of activism, re-
gional celebrities capable of contributing to a school's product dif-
ferentiation image. With the law schools' self-interest in
nourishing these new assets so palpable, the formal institutional-
ization of accountability is inevitable. The informal practice of ad-
290. For a critical review of Dershowitz's "performance," see Garrow, supra
note 12, at 344 n.14, 345 n.16.
291. See Zengerle, supra note 249. "Here are some suggestions for the upcom-
ing federal budget deliberations. An appropriation of $500,000 to George Wash-
ington University professor and expert-on-everything Jonathan Turley not to
appear on television for a year." Kim Eisler, Goodbye James and Mary, Fred and
Mort, Michael and Tony: Take the $$$ and Run, WASH. MAG., Mar. 2002, at 9;
Ruth Marcus, Legal Opinions Offered Freely; Talk Fixture Jonathan Turley Prac-
tices the Art of Analysis, WASH. POST, July 30, 1998, at B1.
292. See Belluck & Steinberg, supra note 205.
293. Garrow, supra note 12, at 345 ("Posner's failure to confront the magnitude
of negative citations either stems from, or at least certainly goes hand-in-hand
with, another even more basic shortcoming in Public Intellectuals, namely his in-
ability to recognize the extent to which PIs do suffer serious reputational harm as
a result of conspicuous inaccuracies or oddball behavior. Posner's assumptions are
glaringly incomplete .... There are two equally devastating ways in which to
rebut this blissful illusion. The first requires the invocation of but a single word:
Dershowitz.") (emphasis added).
294. Which he acknowledges: "My proposal may be modest, but it is also bound
to be controversial and I hold out no hope that it will be adopted." PUBLIC INTEL-
LECTUALS, supra note 2, at 391; see supra note 34.
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vice on outside activities will be formalized to collectivize the
interest of school and professor to assure maximization of benefits.
Moreover, self-policing will improve as the schools monitor each
other, looking for the opportunity to expose the excesses of a
rival.
2 9 5
Whatever the socially constructed parameters, from Fin De
Siecle296 to the latest cultural fad, blogging,297 Public Intellectual-
ism will never gain uncontested credence in the Law Academy as
"serious" scholarship. The Postmodern weltanschauung is suffi-
ciently influential to permit exceptions through the tenure gate
with "non-traditional" baggage - but tagged with an unspoken
question mark after the author's name. There will always be lin-
gering "disquiet" over work that is resistant to critical evalua-
tions.298 Nevertheless, Public Intellectuals know that after tenure,
the issue is largely moot; henceforth the career options include
shirking, "serious" doctrinal scholarship, Public Intellectualism, or
various combinations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Public Intellectualism is amassing sufficient economic and
psychic benefits to make it an attractive career choice. Law profes-
sors can now have fun, vent their frustrations over whatever
bothers them, settle old scores, while building a career in the re-
vised legal education market that provides a bargaining chit for
the annual salary review. In today's Postmodern culture Stephen
Carter stands as the ideal: "serious" scholar turned Public Intellec-
295. See, e.g., Lieter, supra note 276, at 327-28.
296. See Hugh Hebert, Television: Hot Air in the Windy City, THE GUARDIAN
(LoNDON), Jan. 29, 1992, at 34.
297. Stephen Levy, Will the Blogs Kill Old Media?, NEWSWEEK, May 20, 2002,
at 52 ("A blog is an easily updated Web site that works as an online day book,
consisting of links to interesting items on the Web, spur-of-the-moment observa-
tions and real-time reports on whatever captures the blogger's attention."); How-
ard Kurtz, Who Cares What You Think? Blog and Find Out, WASH. POST, Apr. 22,
2002, at C1 ("It's astounding to me." says Glenn Reynolds, a University of Tennes-
see law professor who launched his site (InstaPundit.blogspot.com) last August
with the hope of attracting a couple of hundred readers. He hit a new record last
Monday with 49,663 visits. "It's the dirty little secret of punditry being exposed,
that a lot of people can do it.").
298. In praising a Williams narrative, Posner says: "Yet here at the very pinna-
cle of Williams's art, the careful reader will begin to feel a sense of disquiet." RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 372 (1995).
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tual - who then writes a best-seller mystery novel and pockets a
$4.2 million advance. 299
299. As one critic prefaced a favorable review: "Much as I hate to, I'm going to
start by talking about the damn money. I'm only doing it because almost everyone
else is." Gene Seymour, Poisoned Ivy, THE NATION, July 22/29, 2002, at 25 (review-
ing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE EMPEROR OF OCEAN PARK (2002)); see also David
Owen, From Race to Chase, THE NEW YORKER, June 3, 2002, at 50 (discussing the
life of Stephen Carter).
